This is my preface to:


NOTE: Hampton Press published the initial draft of this preface, not the post-galleys edited version so the printed version has several errors including repeated words such as “to to” on page xx and an entire paragraph (pp. xxii, xxiii). While it is not uncommon to find a few typos in a large text, this is inexcusable. On page xix we find the phrase “personal view-of-view” which should read “personal point-of-view” and a substantive error on page xxix which reads “They [tattoos] are expressions of personal choice and style.” It should read “They are not expressions of personal choice and style.” When I went back to my sent e-mails records to see which final version I had sent to Hampton, it was not the version printed. There was apparently a mix up at Hampton. A professional copy editor did correct the draft text. I reviewed her work and sent it in. Though I requested it, I never got any galleys from Hampton. Hampton has since gone out of business. What follows is the version that should have been published.

PREFACE

Eric Mark Kramer, Series Editor

This volume, Religious Misperceptions: The Case of Muslims and Christians in France and Britain, appearing in the Hampton book series Communication and Comparative Cultures and Civilizations is authored by Dr. Stephen M. Coucher and Dr. Daniel Cronn-Mills. True to the series title, it focuses on communication and cultural differences generally and more specifically issues of social integration between Muslims and non-Muslims in the traditionally and predominantly Christian countries of England and France. It combines survey data with historical and interview data to build a rich portrait of Muslim immigrant life in Europe.

One reason why Muslims are making their way to these countries is because of their historical relationship. The power and prestige of the former colonial center still holds sway over the worldview and values of many who were colonized. And so when they seek to better their lives it is not irrational that they would immigrate to the lands of their former imperial antagonists with whom they have some admiration (perhaps grudgingly), and share some cultural and linguistic identity. Of course it is also the case that across the globe humans are migrating to places with different languages and cultures than what they grew up with.
Unforced immigration is a huge commitment and an equally impressive show of hope and admiration by immigrants for their chosen host society. People who tend to be xenophobic would do well to keep this in mind. If an immigrant chooses your country, that is quite a complement. And they bring with them ambition, new ideas, skills, cuisines, clothing styles, music, literature, motives and expectations. These may be seen as cultural gifts. Their presence functions to increase y(our) choices and make y(our) society broad-based, vibrant and cosmopolitan. They bring options. Meaning comes from difference. Sameness, redundancy, is meaningless. Even y(our) favorite song, if you listen to it enough, will become boring and then irritating.

Host nation receptivity, that is, how welcoming a country is to immigrants varies. In other words, culture matters. Reducing all the struggles an immigrant encounters in her adjustment to her own “internal” personality traits and assuming axiomatically that all human personalities are the same, reducible to just two psychological types, “open-minded” (“plastic”) or “closed-minded” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 369) is woefully inadequate. The problem is the misappropriation of a paradigm – the failure to first identify the essential nature of one’s subject-matter before making presumptions about it and theorizing about it.

Unlike the natural sciences where if you know how one helium atom behaves under certain conditions, you know how they all will, the social scientist must contend with a subject-matter whose behavior is far less predictable or generalizable. Making simple and sweeping generalizations, for instance, that if an immigrant is “dissatisfied” then they must be communicatively incompetent or worse, “mentally ill,” as some claim (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 352; Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 372-373), is bad science, especially in the absence of proof. It is also simply incorrect. Such effort to generalize across a wide “range of persons, settings, times, and messages” requires much more than “surface similarity” (Shapiro, 2002, p. 491). Generalizability in the service of theory building requires “a constantly evolving scientific discourse across multiple studies about how social meaning and social behaviors impact outcomes” (p. 491). This is exactly what Croucher and Cronn-Mills are doing in this volume as they continue the work begun by Croucher in his 2009 book Looking Beyond the Hijab.

Subjective variability, cultural context and circumstance complicate our efforts to assign all of humanity to a couple of categories. In the face of such variance and mutability (as a single individual never stays the same – unlike our helium atom) it is exceedingly difficult to write universal laws of human behavior, or to reduce behavior to a handful of axioms. However, this is exactly the approach we too often find in the literature and almost always made by writers who have spent almost no time doing empirical research. This current volume presents rare empirical data about immigration in modern Europe that is bringing religious and cultural traditions together in intercultural communication and multicultural communities.

In the field of psychotherapy, experts are increasingly stressing the need for cultural literacy when treating patients. In the field of intercultural communication, ignoring real cultural differences is, well, as the word suggests, self-imposed ignorance. Of all fields, intercultural communication demands deep and broad knowledge of specific cultures in order to understand how people from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds actually interact. As Shapiro (2002) notes, simplifying explanations by referencing surface similarities is not adequate. The problem in the field is real and can be illustrated.

Take for instance the overly simplistic claim that “ethnicity-reinforcing influences” such as reading an ethnic community newspaper (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 372) is a sign of “psychological problems associated with maladaptation, including a negative self-image, low
self-esteem, low morale, social isolation… and the frustration of being a helpless ‘victim’ of circumstances” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 372). Again, such sweeping generalizations are akin to talk radio “psychiatrists” who offer diagnoses without ever meeting the people they are offering judgmental opinions about. If one does not like to spend time with rocks one should not become a geologist. If you do not like to do archival research or endure long cold nights on mountaintops then you might be wise to steer clear of becoming a historian or astronomer. In this vein, if someone does not like to spend time talking with and observing people, that person should not become a social scientist. But there is a strong trend among some who believe that being “objective” means never really getting to know one’s subjects.

Most scientists are excited to get their hands on specimen, to take a look for themselves through the microscope or telescope. But today virtual research is taking over a sizable chunk of social science inquiry. The distanciation between researcher and subject began first with anonymous surveys that claimed to eliminate the need to actually watch, record and analyze behavior, then by taking a further step away from people by using surveys that researchers task graduate students to conduct for them, and now by hiring companies, of which there are thousands such as Survey Center Online, SurveyMonkey, Attitudes Across America, 20/20 Research, Intellisurvey, Maximum Paid Survey, e-Research Global… et cetera, to do on-line surveys for them.

It would seem from the trends in research that one can now become an expert on human behavior without having ever seen a human. This is an unfortunate trend in social science research. By contrast, in zoology, where researchers do not have to contend with nearly so much cultural and linguistic variability as social scientists, scholars regard years of ethnographic research in the forest living with and studying upland gorillas or wild chimpanzees by researchers such as Dian Fossey and Jane Goodall as the gold standard.

Because increasingly social science “researchers” have no direct access to their subjects, many online survey companies have been enabled to operate as scams. Most survey companies outsource the work to people who want to “make money at home” such as; Express Paid Surveys, Paid Surveys Etc., Survey Scout, ad nauseam, who scam not only the researcher who is too lazy to do her own work, but also the “work at home” surveyors. Disclaimers of earnings for those who would make a living doing surveys while never leaving their kitchen tables are always present on survey company’s websites. This is a “science” increasingly made up of “scholars” who try their best to never actually observe the behavior they claim to explain.

Getting one’s hands dirty, going into the field is why this book by Croucher and Cronn-Mills is so important. This is absolutely essential to doing good socio-cultural research. They have done the hard work of empirical research by conducting ethnographic, direct personal observations and interviews with actual people (not samples of undergraduates induced by extra-credit or even more removed on-line surveys conducted by third parties who have no knowledge of theory or the purpose of the work). And this book follows up on questions that were discovered in previous empirical research published in this book series in 2008, Looking Beyond the Hijab by Croucher. This is solid science that has systematically set out to test claims made about immigrants and other types of intercultural sojourners that are based on little or no empirical data. The results demonstrate a need to rewrite the field of intercultural communication and alter what is being taught in the field to tens of thousands of college students. What are some of these claims that prompted Croucher and Cronn-Mills to go into the field?
Croucher and Cronn-Mills find no lack of sweeping generalizations to test with their data. For instance, Gudykunst and Kim (2003) equate adaptation with assimilation and integration: “Cross-cultural adaptation process involves a continuous interplay of deculturation and acculturation that brings about change in strangers in the direction of assimilation, the highest degree of adaptation theoretically conceivable… complete adaptation is a lifetime goal” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 360). Gudykunst and Kim also define integration as the “maximum convergence of strangers’ internal conditions with those of the [host culture] natives and a minimum maintenance of the original cultural habits” (p. 360).

But adaptation is not the same as assimilation which is not the same as integration. Gudykunst and Kim (2003) also claim that “psychic evolution” (p. 384), “higher cognitive complexity” (p. 383), and the “maturity” and “growth” (p. 381) of immigrants correlates positively with increased assimilation. But they offer no proof. And they argue that assimilation is the same thing as adaptation which is characterized by the immigrant achieving “greater clarity, depth, scope, balance, and integration [emphasis added]” (p. 383). They claim that “integration and maturity” involve “The process [of assimilation which], if successful, means that the individual grows into a new kind of person at a higher level of integration” (p. 381). And while they also equate “adaptation” and assimilation with integration (what they call “functional fitness”) we must disagree as they define integration as, “abandoning our identification with the cultural patterns that have symbolized who we are” (p. 377). They argue that “psychological health” increases in the immigrant as they “acquire and internalize new learning (acculturation) as well as suspend and unlearn old practices (deculturation), so as to move in the direction of an increased functional fitness and ultimately into a state of assimilation” (p. 373). Furthermore, we disagree that failure to “unlearn” “who one is” (p. 377) is a sign of mental illness (pp. 372-373, 376-382). We contend that integration requires, by definition, discrete lifestyles to integrate. Integration is not assimilation into a single, mainstream majority dominated, monoculture (Kramer, 2003).

Though their definition of mental health is questionable, we must also note that for Gudykunst and Kim (2003) mental health is not just positively correlated with the acquisition and internalization of mainstream ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. It also means the willful (“striving”) unlearning (disintegration) of oneself (cognitively and affectively), and is also equated with having a “positive view toward the host society” (p. 382). According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), to be critical of the host mainstream culture, with its dominant power and coercive force, is to be mentally ill and “maladjusted” (pp. 372, 373). They state this as a general principle, no matter what a particular host society might be like in terms of injustice or oppression.

A person can vehemently disagree with what the mainstream power is doing and still be sane and exhibit a very high level of communication competence. Indeed this is usually the case as most liberation movements and struggles for minority rights are led by members of the intelligentsia. Just being very competent in communication skills is not identical with sharing community cohesion and being satisfied and happy with the status quo, which is what they claim (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 373).

While their definition and equation of competence and mental health with conformity to mainstream culture is questionable, it becomes very problematic for Gudykunst and Kim (2003) themselves as they later promote very specific ethical standards they believe should be applied to change all cultures, arguing that mainstream cultures today are not conducive to their ideal version of transculturalism and therefore need to be reengineered “by design” (pp. 396-409).
Note that these experts in intercultural communication are not taking into account cultural variability at all in their plans to reengineer the world. According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003, pp. 391-409), people -- *all people* -- need to learn how to generate and sustain true community, which they define *axiomatically* (once and for all). Insofar as they reiterate and stick to Martin Buber’s work from the 1920’s they do well, but when they mix his existentialist utopian ideas with plans to transform human character on a mass scale to a single form of total “plasticity and adaptability” (p. 380) in the service of conformity to any and all circumstances, they are moving in the exact opposite direction from Buber’s (1923 Ger./1970 Eng.) intent. In fact the way they characterize the human psyche as the stage for pressure-growth reactants is to conceive of human beings as “its” more than as cultured “thous.” According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003) acculturation and enculturation does not presume any reciprocity between the individual and her environment. And so they see the social system as monolithically forcing immigrants to conform or else. When they cite Buber to justify their unilinear model of assimilative conformity (stress-deculturation-acculturation “growth” toward “psychological health” pp. 379-382) their work becomes totally incoherent. The key principle in Buber’s philosophy is authentic reciprocity, not social conformity impressed into a *table rasa* that can be erased and rewritten (“reprogrammed” p. 358) like a hard drive and which also has limited capacity so that learning requires “unlearning” (p. 380).

Unlike Gudykunst and Kim, Buber (as well as George Simmel, who they also claim to draw inspiration from) does *not* promote conformity ideology. This must be clear. To cite Buber and Simmel as some sort of justification via academic tradition for a model of assimilation is confounding. The true predecessors of Gudykunst and Kim’s structural functional ideology, who in fact sound almost identical to their utopian language are the early industrial positivists (August Comte), and the British writers Herbert Spencer and Francis Galton. In the mid to late 1800’s Spencer and Galton had already extensively and more coherently applied the concepts of evolution and adaptation to human social cohesion and progress. For instance in his *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy* (1862) Spencer understood (unlike Gudykunst and Kim) that integration presumes that evolution does not equal conformity but quite the contrary the process of evolution moves from undifferentiated homogeneity to complex, differentiated, heterogeneity. Spencer understood that life proliferates ecologies, forms, and cultures.

Quite unlike Gudykunst and Kim (2003) or their intellectual progenitors Spencer and Galton, both Buber and Simmel recognize that based on particular circumstances, there are times when the mainstream culture should be not only criticized but resisted; “aggressively devaluated,” which the Spencerians Gudykunst and Kim see as a sign of psychological illness, incompetent communication skills, and maladjustment (p. 373). To be clear, to categorically equate social resistance with psychological illness ignores all actual existential conditions which vary from good to evil, and not just regarded as subjective perception and judgment. Only from an absurd position of absolute relativism could one call the extermination of Jewish children or slave children running with Spartacus just and good. Certainly, neither Buber nor Simmel would.

Under certain circumstances, resistance can be rational and just. It is not, *a priori* -- axiomatically, a sign of poor mental health or a failure to achieve “host communication competence” as Gudykunst and Kim claim (pp. 372, 373). This is where intercultural communication, written in a cultural void, without doing the hard empirical work of assessing actual specific cultural interactions within historical and sociological context, fails. And this is why the sort of work presented herein by Croucher and Cronn-Mills is so valuable. Before one
theorizes one must leave the office and get dirty studying real people in real situations. The axiomatic approach works with virtual mathematical logic but not with actual people. Cultural discovery is not found in books and journals.

According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003) the old adage, when in Rome, do as the Romans do, is not enough. They argue that to be a “functionally fit” member of a community, one must also think and feel as the mainstream Roman does. But we know from empirical observation that true communicative competence involves not a zero-sum conformity to a single code but the ability to switch between multiple codes with skilled alacrity.

Being bicultural is a common trait of immigrants, a strength exhibiting cognitive and cultural complexity. Most immigrants learn to conform to expected behaviors in their work cultures and public sphere as when they go to public schools and events like fairs and malls, and follow norms in driving and standing in lines, et cetera. But when they go home at the end of the day they switch back to their native language, cuisine, games, music, topics of conversation, religious observances, health practices, and so forth. And there is no problem. Entire neighborhoods have stable ethnic accents as self-segregating groups enjoy being themselves on their own time, at home. And yet they prosper and enrich the overall society with the diversity they offer. This is the potential of the United States creed. It has been a fairly stable pluralism, but one cannot ignore the catastrophic Civil War and slow struggle to expand civil liberties.

History teaches that the sort of coercive pressure to force immigrants to disintegrate at the psychological level and conform to the “accepted modes of experience” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 378) presented by the dominant mainstream culture, the “conformity pressure” which Gudykunst and Kim (2003, pp. 358-374, 375-384) argue is necessary for personal “evolution,” “growth,” “upward-forward progress,” and “maturity,” even the increased mental health of immigrants, only leads to resentment and hostilities. And what of those who really do internalize the mainstream values, aesthetic, and beliefs but who cannot conform such as being black in a predominantly white world, old in a youth oriented culture, or being homosexual in a predominantly heterosexual world? Hostility can manifest as self-hate too (Kramer, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). This is the point W. E. B. Dubois (2003) made back in 1903 in his classic The Souls of Black Folk when he wrote of the pain of inhabiting double (what we might say today incommensurate) consciousness. Getting over means to abandon such a futile and absurd goal. If a black girl cannot look like the white Hollywood stars in her magazines which she truly idolizes, is she insane for not conforming? Clearly not. Integration is not the same thing as conformity. Sanity is more complex than simply internalizing the values and beliefs of the majority and of aping their behavior as Gudykunst and Kim suggest (p. 360).

Gudykunst and Kim (2003) and other total assimilationists, meaning the demand that immigrants conform behaviorally, cognitively, and affectively, encourage immigrants to totally unlearn themselves because they presume a modernist spatial, variable-linear way of thinking that is false (Kramer, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2003). By contrast the theory of cultural fusion (Kramer, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2008), which Croucher and Cronn-Mills refer to in this book, argues that neither an immigrant’s personal growth nor the enrichment of a community is a zero-sum closed administrative structure (not open system) which demands that to learn something new, something old must be unlearned. Rather the process is one of accumulating new repertoires of thinking, feeling, cooking, singing, working, dressing, playing… Just because I learn soccer does not mean I must unlearn tennis. Such a false presumption has caused much trouble in inter-ethnic communication.
As noted above, cultural context matters when discussing immigrant experience. Even sister cultures such as France and England, born of the same civilizational structure, present quite different challenges to the immigrant sojourner. Indeed even the trajectory of entry makes a huge difference in immigrant adjustment and integration. What is meant by this is someone moving to a rural area to work, for instance, as a meatpacker in Nebraska, as compared with moving to an urban area like Los Angeles to do construction, pose very different adjustment issues. Similarly, if the immigrant comes from a rural background such as a Kayan from the Burmese highlands as compared with an urban background such as a Cantonese immigrant from Hong Kong also pose great variance in the process of cultural adjustment and integration.

Cultural integration is a process that involves social construction. It is a communicative process which does not belong to just one of the participants. Just as two rooms share the same wall, the host and the immigrant share the same interface, the same communicative event. But what it means, how it is decorated and presented varies. Yet as the wall changes in nature, both “sides” are affected.

The degree of cultural similarity between the immigrant’s home culture and her destination culture and the reasons for immigration and migration as well as the expected length of stay all constitute variance. The nature of the communicative experience varies. Each immigrant is a cultural being, with core values, beliefs, expectations, and motivations indigenous to her very identity. In short, one simple explanation does not fit all circumstances.

To understand adjustment issues, how a host society and immigrants co-evolve, grow and survive together as integral, requires detailed knowledge of their various cultural identities. This requires knowledge of different cultures (including religious traditions), historical circumstances, and languages. It is hard work that most authors of intercultural communication books completely ignore and leave to cultural anthropologists. A few such as Eric Kramer (2000b, 2003, 2008) take an ecological approach to intercultural communication and argue that communication is a two-sided affair which involves simultaneous adjustments on “each side” between the host culture and the immigrant, what he calls co-evolution, a longstanding concept in biology which recognizes mutualism, sometimes even co-dependence as exemplified by the relationship between species. A famous example is the co-dependence between Angraecoid orchids, with their long nectaries, that are pollinated only by long proboscis African moths.

Symbiology is biology. It is the realization of principles of systems theory (including chaos… which is not as chaotic as some would have us believe), within the process of life. Life never stagnates even when it has achieved forms that are extremely successful like single-celled microorganisms that have thrived in the oceans since the beginning. Symbiosis includes mutuality, co-dependence, commensalism, parasitism, and other forms of interaction between unlike organisms. It is the communicative processes that also characterizes how species and the larger climate (including for humans socio-cultural and political-economic climates) exist. This systems approach is fundamentally different from linear structural functionalism which dominants intercultural communication research and theorizing.

The co-evolutionary or more precisely pan-evolutionary quality of social systems introduced into intercultural communication studies by Kramer (1997, 2003, 2008) is similar to the approach you will find in this book by Croucher and Cronn-Mills. Text and context share a mutual and mutable boundary. One wall creates two rooms. Their characteristics such as size and shape are inseparably intertwined.

When immigrants arrive, the community changes. They are always already an integral part of the overall system with consequences. In fact, in an increasingly global postmodern
world where boundaries form “inside” (domestic) and “outside” foreign spaces, boundaries become so permeable as to be meaningless. There is no single logic for this or simple explanation such as increased productive efficiency based on communicative competence. It is a dissipative phenomenon. One consequence is the actions of people who never come to your country may have a profound impact on it and on you. An example is indigenous Chinese labor practices and how those impact labor costs, unit prices, and production globally. They do not “play by the same rules,” and what counts as communication competence is totally foreign and yet they influence your world. The process is one of dissipative, fluctuating synergies. And once a part of the system, even the absence of the Other has consequences, as when illegal migrants are deported leaving employers suddenly at a loss for vital labor. While often denigrated as lowly work, most would probably agree that the result, picked fruit and produce essential to the domestic food-chain are highly tangible and visible aspects of the public sphere. They are actually very important to us psychologically and also physically. For instance “simple” landscaping and lawn services help control misquotes which may seem of marginal value until one takes into account problems like West Nile Virus and the Malaria causing \textit{Plasmodium} parasite).

Even in a total dictatorship, the dominant social group must take into account the existence of all members including the weakest in the social system and address those needs otherwise the system will have no stability. As soon as an immigrant enters a neighborhood, she has changed the system. At first the influence may be imperceptible but it becomes more manifest with time.

According to systems theory, emergent structures in a self-organizing system, which human society is, is based on pan-evolutionary processes where different stakeholders exert their needs and their abilities on each other affecting each other’s evolution; \textit{qua} change through communication (Kramer, 2000b, 2000c, 2003).

Recognizing culture and its differences makes for a much more complex understanding of intercultural communication than the typical reductionistic psychologistic approach. Communication by nature is a social phenomenon. To ignore this means to ignore the diverse complexities of socio-cultural churning and fusing (not blending) (Kramer, 2000b, 2002, 2008). The vast majority of social scientific efforts to explain intercultural communication fail miserably because such efforts begin with psychological axioms ignoring the complex meanings socio-cultural issues such as race, religion, levels of educational attainment, language, and other sociological phenomena have for people. Solid research requires that we do the hard work of detailing all such variances that involve core values, meanings, beliefs, expectations, and motivations. Instead the mainstream intercultural communication work presumes as its explanatory foundation a universal psychologistic model while completely ignoring historical and cultural differences even as writers claim to explain inter-cultural communication issues.

Croucher and Cronn-Mills begin the arduous task of exposing the complexities involved in voluntary Muslim immigration and integration in urban France and England. Such work is necessary if any seriously rigorous approach to intercultural communication and conflict is to be done. They are studying attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and behaviors related to Islamophobia.

Back in 2000, The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain established by the Runnymede Trust published a report on the status of Muslim immigrants in England and in that report they coined the term “Islamophobia” to identify the irrational fear of and collective prejudice against Muslims in their adopted homelands of Western Europe generally and England specifically. Because this is not a new problem, Croucher and Cronn-Mills present a chapter on
the very different historical relationships France and England have had with Islam. They cover pre-colonial contact, French and English colonization of Muslim lands, their subsequent withdraw from those lands, and today’s large influx of Muslim immigrants and the new face of Islamophobia. One cannot divorce text from context. It is a basic hermeneutic tenet that one cannot understand present motives for behavior without historical and cultural context (Dilthey, 1910 Ger./2002 Eng.). We are well aware of the challenge of fatalistic historicism and other isms to behavior but one cannot ignore the facts of historical, linguistic, spiritual, and cultural dimensions to human reality if one hopes to understand human identity and behavior at all.

The popularity of European destinations for North Africans, Asian-Indians, Pakistanis, and also Turks (in the case of Germany especially) is a consequence of their former historical and colonial relationships. But in the process this does not mean that either the host Europeans or these immigrants want to become, or even believe they can become identical. According to the theories of dimensional accrual and dissociation and cultural fusion (Kramer, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2002, 2003, 2008) which Croucher and Cronn-Mills apply in this book, the urban notion of modern citizenship is relatively contingent and a highly dissociated sense of identity when compared with magic blood identity and mythic religious/ethnic identity. Dissociation involves abstraction and fragmentation and an increasing sense of objectification which involves a decline in emotional attachment; to put it simply, care. There is an inverse relationship between dissociation and emotional attachment. As dissociation (abstract objectification) increases emotional attachment decreases.

Citizenship typically does not evoke as much emotion as religious/spiritual or ethnic/racial identification. Identity in the magic one-dimensional sense is not mutable. It is an eternal, inherent identification. In fact it is so presumed as to never become an issue and so magic peoples do not speak in terms of “identity” and they certainly do not suffer “identity crises” unless an outside cultural force moves in upon them (plural) and disrupts their world in an apocalyptic fashion (which colonialism has done many times). People often reaffirm their worldview in the face of such threats through collective ritual and ceremony such as the Northern Plains Lakota Sioux’s Ghost Dance, Passover for Jews or the overt and emotionally intense expressions of patriotism across the U.S. after the destruction of the World Trade Towers in New York City. Recall that even the normally irreverent comedians among us drastically altered their content and delivery for a period of spontaneous mourning, shared anger, and public reflection. This demonstrates that the communal magic one-dimensional aspect of our being (“we” as opposed to “I”) is quite real and vitally potent. By comparison the threat to modern three-dimensional egoistic identity is much different, much more “personal,” rather than coming from external cultural forces.

Identity in the two-dimensional mythic sense is mutable but not seen as an arbitrary individual choice. Only in the modern sense of identity does one perceive the self as independent and “self-made,” “self-determined.” Insofar as identity depends on difference, the concept of modern identity does not apply to the implicit sense of belonging found in magic and mythic communities. In magic community, the modern sense of private identity is unthinkable let alone a matter of personal choice. By contrast, for the highly dissociated modern, community increasingly dissolves as the basis for identity. Independence and liberation from all exogenous forces and authority characterizes the good for the modern. Being unique/creative rather than redundant is what the modern individualist prides herself on.

As one moves from one-dimensional magic, to two-dimensional mythic, to the three-dimensional modern weltanschauung (fundamental worldview) dissociation increases and is
manifested as emergent spatial thinking evinced by separation/objectification. Increasingly space emerges as that which is in-between separate things. The process is one of the individual slowly emerging out from the rest of the cosmos until she becomes utterly independent with all else becoming mere background to her story and projects. Reality for the Modern is her point-of-view, perspectively egocentric. The birth of biography and autobiography is a hallmark sign of modernity. The classical hero with its selfish tendencies is the nascent ego and its initial emergence is met with anxiety and apprehension (see the characterization of Achilles in the *Iliad*).

One can historically trace the emergence of the modern individual through naming. Initially Medievals had no names. As dissociation and egoism increased they took clan or surnames where everyone in the clan shared the same name often linking individuals through lineage with patronyms or matronyms or taken from the land or estate with which they identified. The clan name is not “given.” While still highly collectivistic, no personal choice is involved. The name is given. It is a highly motivated name. You are your identity through clan-blood and land tie. Then due to the urge for further individuation, which is the process of fragmenting dissociation, people began to take personal names given to them individually by their clan (later limited to their parents). Thus, “first” given names identified an individual. Individuation further increased as many began to take “middle” names, and so forth. The hypertrophic modern now feels free to abandon even the name given to them by their parents and take one of their own choosing.

Fragmentation is the essence of precision in identification/measurement. Given names are by choice and are therefore, compared to surname, arbitrary. They reflect the emergence of the “emancipated” ego and a growing precision of individuating identity.

In the modern world even language itself comes to be seen as arbitrary, and spatial thinking influences the conceptual separation of the signified from the signifier. All things are reduced to statistical probability including word-use frequency. Logic as a mode of relating separate values and personal analytical skepticism characterizes the modern *weltanschauung*. Faith becomes devalued as a form of blindness. Modernity is also manifested as fragmenting individuation/individualism. “Knowing thyself” involves the idea of definition. The definition of the word “definition” is the ability to resolve two adjacent objects as separate. This Socratic dictum announces the emergence of the modern ego-individual in Classical Greece. The Self emerges as an object/target for its own directional consciousness. And so reflective critical analysis infused the Hellenistic and later Republican Roman worlds. The ability to step out of one’s situation and reflect upon it assessing it gives rise to the notion of progress, utopianism, ideology, and efforts to realize them. Such constructivism gave birth to the rational attitude of problem solving. This early form of modernity later faded as Europe shifted back into predominantly magic and mythic modalities characterized by the idea of infallible living god rulers; what modernists in their egocentric bias call the “Dark Ages” that form the “Middle” between classical and Renaissance modernisms. Modern-style rationality in the form of the methodical philosopheme confronts infallibility with relentless questioning thus demanding personal freedom. The modality of perspectivism, of personal point-of-view and oppositional, spatial-linear inquiry is nicely summarized in the proclamation stated at the beginning of every debate: “I resolve that…”

As dissociation increases beyond the one-dimensional magic structure to the two-dimensional mythic structure, group identities emerge and solidify and the whole of “we” fragments further into sectors each with its own founding story or myth of being the only true
humans – the chosen ones. Sectarian reality is thus born. Group privileging as an aspect of mythic identity is the origin of sectarian internal cohesion and external violence. The very notions of inside and outside, internal and external emerge with spatial thinking. So too does in-group/out-group identification, and eventually private versus public domains (spatially articulated by Moderns as “spheres”).

Finally as dissociation continues, atomization occurs whereby group/sect identities splinter into separate individual egos. Psychology is thus born with the first fully realized modernist Aristotle, in his De Anima; the treatise describing the fragmentation of animistic spirit into individual souls. Aristotle initiates the fragmentation of knowledge into categories and disciplines based on essential qualities, what Edmund Husserl called the institution of metaphysical fragmentation in the form of regional ontologies (1954 Ger./1970 Eng.). The Modern equates knowing itself with the ability to categorize case. And like all modern “disciplines,” psychology seeks to explain everything from its fundamentalist “building block” metaphysic; the individual psyche. We can watch the shift from mythic to perspectival modernity as we notice that Socrates yet lived in an oral world while Plato began the more private mode of expression by writing down his philosophy but still in dialogue form. With Aristotle, monadic prose is the form taken by his private analytical reflections. Silent reading and reflection would soon follow. Knowledge becomes established by personal/private, direct observation. Category and case converge by means of generalizing logic via essential qualities.

The magic world explains everything in terms of animistic, amorphous forces that are ubiquitous, cognizant and potent (powerful). By comparison, the mythic world explains everything in terms of its founding sacred stories with semi-linear structure that yield ambiguous histories and group identities (the chosen versus the rejected). And the modern world tends to explain everything in terms of clear chains of causation which is a reductionistic mode of explanation positing first-causes with behavior originating in physical properties expressed through chemical reactions manifested in biological processes such as instinct underlying individual psychological traits, drives, and motivations.

Once all people were identical -- of the same blood-kin. One blood, one spirit flowed through all -- the same. Magic identity literally means to be identical. Our tribe may be aware of other people-like animals in the next valley over, but they are not truly people. We are the people and the people are one. If one cries we all cry. If one dances we all dance. There is no empty space and therefore no theatrical distance. Drama is everywhere. There are no passive observers watching the action on a stage. As dissociation occurs, “the people” shrinks to the tribe which shrinks to the clan among other clans (that are human, barely; despicable in most ways yet tolerable) which shrinks to the extended family, down to the nuclear family, and finally to the modern independent individual. Today while most recognize other races as human they still do not want their children to have offspring with “them.” Typically stories, often mythic/sacred ones are repeated to justify such group identity and prejudice.

One example to illustrate the recent power of such feelings is the anti-miscegenation rules established by the Hayes Commission in the twentieth century U.S. These rules prohibited even the portrayal or suggestion of interracial marriage or sexual relations. The result was “yellowface” in Hollywood with John Wayne portraying the Mongolian Genghis Khan in The Conqueror (1956), Katherine Hepburn portraying a Chinese woman in Dragon Seed (1944), Marlon Brandon portraying a Japanese man in The Teahouse of the August Moon (1956), Christopher Lee portraying the diabolical Fu Manchu (1965). Even after the end of the Hayes Commission the practice continued with several examples including; Linda Hunt in The Year of
Living Dangerously (1982), Leonard Nimoy as the character Ach Met in Marco Polo, a television miniseries (1982), or David Carradine portraying “Poon Dong” in the 2009 feature film Crank: High Voltage. While yellowface may be justified as comedic in films such as Balls of Fury (2007), featuring Christopher Walken, the civil rights movement that was cast as basically a black struggle in the U.S. for equality, has made blackface unacceptable even, and perhaps especially, for comedic effect. Race yet matters. And so does religion.

In the magic world calamity is a function of titanic forces and it vibrates through every person, object, animal, indeed the land and cosmos itself. Magic human is not an integral “part” of the cosmos; a part among other parts. Rather magic human is cosmic. The dissociated fragmentation of part and whole do not exist for magic humanity. With dissociation and emergent ego-consciousness we see calamity become more specific. Sin, once shared by all in the clan, becomes in modernity limited to the independent individual so that the sins of the father are not shared by the utterly separate son. With the advent of modernity, collective shame gives way to individual guilt, and morality becomes separated from legality. However, magic and mythic elements endure. We still tend to laugh and cry together, what psychologists call “sympathy” and “emotional contagion” – manifestations of magic consciousness yet potent in the modern world.

We see this process of increasing dissociation/fragmentation, often in the interest of greater definition/precision (the power to measure/define afforded by objectification), reflected in spiritual discourse. For instance, dissociation as a measure of care (or sorge for Martin Heidegger, 1927 Ger./ 1996 Eng.) correlates with fragmentation as all-pervasive animism fragments into a finite number of titanic forces that have distinct domains where they work their power, which in turn give birth to much more defined and discrete Gods who exterminate their titanic parents and who manifest unique personalities, cares and interests, and who move spatially away from humanity (usually off to far mountain tops). The revolutionary extermination of the Titans by the Gods marks the boundary between the magic and mythic worlds.

Human consciousness begins in the animal consciousness we call archaic. The disintegration of the primordial archaic whole continues into the magic, to the mythic and to the modern perspectival. This process of dissociation and fragmentation continues and is manifested in many modes of expression including the spiritual. In the realm of spiritual expression it continues from omnipresent animism, to a finite number of titanic naturalistic forces, to gods with egos and specific locales, until there is only one total and central ego left (monotheism) which reflects the emergence of individualism (Kramer, 1997; 2003). Only in the modern world is the cosmos devoid of spirit.

Only in the modern world is religious identification reduced to institutional “affiliation,” which implies voluntary membership, which implies the possibility of not being a member. Not being a member is impossible in the magic world. Being expelled from the magic group is a death sentence. The modern notion of affiliation, as opposed to magic identification, also indicates a decline in emotional attachment/care. In the magic world no such contingency or personal choice is thinkable. Obligation, care, is cosmic and presumed.

“Religion” does not exist in the magic world. Religion, derived from religiō, re-ligāre, means “to bind.” Religion forms the ligaments that bind a self-same identity and community at the deepest level after magic holism begins to disintegrate. Religious membership and affiliation function to convene or bind as in covenant, an overt conscious agreement according to oath and creed. For magic people there is no need for religion for disintegration is not a threat. But once
disharmony begins to be felt then an overt effort must be made to reestablish and maintain eternal preperspectival harmony. Anything less is catastrophic. The cosmos itself could cease to be. Magic is more fundamental than myth. One cannot bind that which is not first separated or which seems to be separating. Religion, with all the effort poured into its sacred texts, liturgy, ceremony, organization/ordination, its threats and armies -- religion is a reaction to the felt dissociation which is calamitous from a magic point-of-view. Religion is salvation for a magic world in trouble. The more the world seems to be falling apart, the more people turn to religion.

Immigrants face incalculable challenges in their everyday lives. To expect them to abandon their religious identities in order to assimilate is utterly unrealistic. They are much more likely to give up legal citizenship than to give up their religion. Coerced conversion is a profoundly violent act. According to Gudykunst and Kim’s (2003) cultural “adaptation” theory (qua assimilation) host cultures exert “coercive pressure” (p. 360) and that those who resist by continuing “ethnic involvement” (p. 365) and “self-assertion” of their ethnic identity (p. 371) are “immature” (p. 381) communicatively incompetent, (p. 361), out of control (p. 369), urealistic (p. 369), mentally ill (p. 365, 373, 382), “ethnocentric” (p. 376), and ultimately not “fit to live in the company of others” (p. 358). No doubt many anti-immigrant conservatives in France and England heartily agree.

For magic people identity is not an issue because in a holistic cosmos there is no difference, only pars pro toto and toto pro pars. While knowledge for the modern is based on identification via distinction (categorization and sub-categorization), the magic person has no knowledge as such but rather wisdom in the Taoist sense. When identity becomes an issue it is a disaster because, for the magic person, it heralds cosmic disintegration. In the magic world, identity is utterly presumed and “membership” is an unthinkable concept, for belonging is neither contingent nor arbitrary. The very idea of membership indicates a problem. It implies the possibility of not being one with the cosmos or “a people,” a mere member, a “part” of a disintegrating cosmos. The organic cosmos disintegrates into the mechanistic cosmos and with fragmentation, communication between fragments becomes a critical issue.

All of modern epistemology is premised upon the uniquely modern problem of how the parts communicate – how I can know the other. This is not an issue in the magic world. They do not obsess over metaphysics, epistemology or gaps between dualities. Nor do they suffer from identity crises.

For magic people the cosmos is not a machine of discrete pieces, even if they are defined by the Modern in functional logical terms as independent but interdependent “parts.” “Membership” is not the same thing as inherent identity. Belonging/identity is not a choice in the magic world.

By contrast, in the mythic religious cosmos, one can be cast “out,” “down.” Nascent spatial thinking as fragmenting souls and separation is evident. But for the spaceless and timeless magic person, there is no place “else” to go. Even the deceased ancestors are everywhere “right here” with us always “now.” I am them and they are me. This is the magic unitary essence of communion. Good and evil are not yet separate. All early languages manifest such ambiguity as one term may signify both “good” and “evil.”

By comparison, in the mythic world the semantic field begins to see a separation between the sacred and the profane (secular) poles of reality. Time begins to elongate and eventually breaks into past, present, and future. The spiritual slowly coalesces, forms, retreats into a realm or domain within a larger reality. All things partake of the polar spiritual constitutive arrangement of sacred and profane. Not all spaces are sacred.
In the modern *weltanschauung*, the world bifurcates into a duality of opposing domains; the sacred and the profane. Time becomes fundamental as the profane secular world is of time and the sacred is timeless. In modernity, religion is reduced to a social institution and segregated, existing along side of, but separate from, other institutions such as education, government, and economy. Its “reach,” its in-fluence, is clearly demarcated and limited. Religion emerges as something increasingly dissociated from other aspects of life. Even as it is itself a manifestation of cosmic fragmentation, religion functions as a solution to the rising sense of dissociation/disintegration and the horror and despair it harbors for magic human. But for the Modern, its influence in other domains causes anxiety. For the Modern, religion’s binding function is what the individual seeks to be liberated from.

Eventually, in modernity, the spiritual is clearly defined and demarcated -- separated from secular power and activity (the famous separation of church and state). Just because I want to come to your country and become a citizen does not mean I want to abandon my religious faith. These two things function within two very different, incommensurate consciousness structures/ *weltanschauung*. An integral approach to social reality will recognize this, and expect some discontinuity as well as multi-cultural enrichment.

Religion seeks to bind that which is coming apart. When it fails we often have the existential crisis of the modern individual who perceives no association, no obligation, no meaning, no purpose, and no sense. The cosmos becomes an empty dispassionate place and the modern human embraces disinterest as the proper mode of analytical observation. Emotional detachment is the essence of objective observation. Hence, Augustine’s disparagement of casual curiosity.

Religion binds but the felt need to bind, the passion presumes a sense of rising fragmentation. Religion is a reaction to the disintegration of the magic world at the most profound cosmic level. Mythic religion, compared with magic holistic spirituality, heralds a disintegrating world. Myth/religion is a manifestation of, and exists in, a fragmenting world. As such, its sense is more arbitrary than magic. It is written, invented, contrived – yet inspired. The two-dimensional mythic world is characterized by being arbitrary, by exhibiting the polarity of literal and figural aspects both at once. Myth/religion is interpretable, edited. Religion seeks legitimacy in magic origins. It seeks legitimacy and potency not in contingent structures and artifacts, but in irreplaceable, inherently sacred artifacts – relics that have inherent power (magic). More purely (“earlier” though it is still vital) magic is not spatial and therefore is not contained, but like animistic spirit, pervades all. Rising spatial thinking manifests as groups that form along religious lines. As dissociation continues, religions further fragment into sectarian sub-groups seeking independence from obligation to central authority. Authority fragments. In the postmodern world there is no central authority. Eventually, the postmodern individual emerges seeking independence from all obligation and authority including the modern authority of secular government. Conscience itself comes under attack. Rather than being presumed, identity becomes a psychic crisis. The prefix a- in atheist is not anti-theist. The atheist is not against god. Rather, the atheist does not even recognize the existence of gods at all. The modern individual simply does not perceive the supernatural as real except as a dramatic element in fictional storytelling. It has value as entertainment.

To summarize, religion emerges as the cosmos fragments and the meaning of the cosmos, how it is perceived and interpreted fractures into different stories. The conflict of interpretations emerges which indicates a nascent humanism; the human element in reading and commentary, interpretation as perspective.
Variance, differing readings; a multiplicity of interpretations emerges. This is nothing less than a crisis for the magic, and to a lesser degree, mythic worlds. Faith, as the possibility of doubt, emerges. Nascent calculation emerges as suspicion. Faith means to believe without reasons but increasingly reasons and explanations; questions arise. The cosmos intensifies with disharmonic tones. To think is to be critical. As the history of knowledge itself, as the history of criticism, commentary, exegetical contemplation, and hermeneutics reveal, dissociation leads from total identity with the whole not yet polarized into sacred and secular, to a fragmentation of interpretations (schools of thought), disputation, dialectics, and tests (controlled experiments), reaching to dispassionate analysis and examination of all things as subject to disinterested observation including religion as a social institution and its texts as historical artifacts.

Eventually myth is reduced to just another literature or form of language-use to be rendered by statistical computation ala Claude Levi-Strauss' (1958 Fr./1963 Eng.) dream of a science of interpretation, computational reading, that reveals structural requirements that determine the only possible meaning of any text including myth. Human interpretation is rejected as fickle. Computers can read and determine the correct interpretation by compiling the frequency of word-use. Computers can also replace judges and juries. They can also more logically and consistently render and apply policies than legislatures. Posthumanism is the rejection of the subject as nothing more than the source of error. The human is no more important or valuable than any other part of the universe. Inherency including the inherent morality of an act despite outcomes is abandoned, and the Modernist spatialized notion of justice as ratio, balance, equality, is also abandoned. The universe does not care at all.

When this occurs, as Mircea Eliade (1957 Ger./1987 Eng.) says, myth/religion dies. It is reduced to the one positively correct answer for all times. For Eliade, the more important question to ask of religion is not if it is empirically, referentially true or false, but if it is alive or dead. If it is alive, then it yet fundamentally constitutes part or all of one’s identity and worldview. People still live according to its precepts making it breath. As such, it is not available for analytical reflection as something separate from who I am. The identity of magic incantation that invites no reflection, no questioning, no doubt, shifts to religious interpretation which exhibits the rise of subjective perception/understanding (the nascent spatial attitude is evident in the notion of taking a “position” or “stand” vis-à-vis a text), leading to objective analytical disinterest.

Subjectivity emerges with, and as the binary opposite of, objectivity. When religion becomes an object of analysis, it increasingly comes to be seen as mere subjective interpretation; finally as a matter of personal choice; contingent perspective. When dead, it enters modern “no touch” museum space which is constituted for dissociated gazing (to garner the “best view”), not using/dwelling. Religions are ideologized, collected, dissected, compared and contrasted – no longer animated, inhabited, lived.

However, for the mythic faithful, religion still constitutes such a deep part of identity (not quite magical but yet very emotional) that one may convert, but conversion involves a very important transformation of worldview involving strong emotion. For the magic and mythic person, conversion is a form of death to one faith and rebirth to another. In the conversion process one’s social and psychological worlds may change profoundly including abandonment by one’s family and old friends, one’s community and correlative identity, and acceptance by new ones. But this magic and mythic process is far more traumatic than merely changing secular citizenship. Religion for the mythic person is alive and characterized by passion. It is far more
than a doctrine or an ideology. Seeking a deeper understanding is tolerable. But questioning religious faith itself is playing with fire.

In the modern world of ideologies, the individual may very well choose a different religious affiliation than her parents or decide to reject spirituality altogether as silly superstition based on irrational emotional needs. And changing affiliation is far less “serious” (emotional) for the Modern than it is for the magic premodern or the mythic unmodern person. The modern individual strives to emancipate herself from care and obligation. Religious affiliation becomes a matter of personal choice. To a magic or mythic person, this version of religion is not religious at all. Also the notion that change is good, including “progress,” is a uniquely modern attitude (Kramer, 1997). The ego- and ethnocentrism of this idea is clearly articulated as the Saint-Simonian positivists conveniently placed their own positivism at the top of their hierarchy of human development.

In the magic world animism pervades all. Everything is alive and full. There is no vacuum, no in-between that needs to be bridged, no problem of knowing and communicating. Everything is sacred and therefore overt modification of the natural order is resisted for it may well offend spirits. Consequently, material technology does not dominate culture. In the modern world the universe is largely dead and empty. The world is converted by our mode of perception as something fundamentally other than us, a place upon which human plans and calculations can be projected. Nature becomes base with plans and calculations forming superstructural ideology. Civilization is increasingly equated with technology and people are classified as nature-like savages versus civilized and sophisticated, “cultured” people. Modernity is characterized by the large scale technological modification of the landscape and the reorganization of the essentially identical and infinite “building blocks of nature” at will (ego-expression as intent). Modern ambition is not hampered by spiritual concerns/care. Politics emerges as the struggle over which plan for making the future will prevail. The human identity emerges as the will-to-power, for all technology is human made and magic is the first expression of this directional intent to modify things as they are. The more privatized resources become and hording occurs, the more power struggles (politics being the struggle over who controls resource allocations) infiltrate life.

For the magic person the sacred is not only real, it is irreplaceable. It cannot be replicated at will. The sacred is nonnegotiable. But for the Modern everything is arbitrary and replaceable and therefore, the Modern has difficulty understanding why a “mere spot of land” such as the Jewish Temple Mount and the Muslim Dome of the Rock (the Al-Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem evoke so much emotion. To the Modern it is real estate. It is arbitrary, redundant with other bits of land with equal size, and negotiable. To the Jew and Muslim, however, nothing could be more wrong. This land is not arbitrary. It is sacred (eternal) and as such, irreplaceable. To suggest it is negotiable, even in the pursuit of mortal/political peace, is blasphemy. This mere “piece of land” is worth defending to the death – worth raising one’s children to defend it to the death. And so we have centuries of deadlock that can be understood only if one understands the fundamental differences between magic, mythic, and modern consciousness structuration and the process of dissociation that inversely correlates with emotional attachment/identification (Gebser, 1949, 1953 Ger./1985 Eng.; Kramer, 1997, 2003).

To understand the stresses involved with immigration, one must understand the various forms of identity (belonging) involved and the various intensities of emotional commitment involved (and outlined above). Modern citizenship has the sense of being far more arbitrary than ethnic identity. Citizenship may well be a personal choice, especially for an immigrant deciding where to move. While ethnic identity may be held as sacred, the variables used for deciding
where to move are more profane such as economic opportunity and a common language; basically issues of mortal convenience and professional ambition. While citizenship may be an issue of rational/personal choice, linguistic, racial, and other aspects of ethnicity are things one is born into. The ceremony and oath taking that are the naturalization process for new citizens has magic, mythic, and modern dimensions. But it is usually not held to be as sacred, as emotionally charged and meaningful as religious conversion. The immutable and eternal racial and ethnic dimensions of identity constitute who one is and who one’s children shall be -- no matter what country they choose to live in. Even language evokes more emotion than the legal status of citizenship.

Language does not belong to me as private property. I belong to it. As Martin Heidegger (1927 Ger./1996 Eng.) in his notion of the linguisticality of Dasein argues, language speaks us as much as we speak language. And religious identity is much more sacred than the language that speaks us, though, in the context of sacred texts such as the Holy Quran, language itself (in this case Arabic) becomes nonnegotiable and sacred, the eternal words of God. Many Muslims believe that no matter how many translations one may have read, if one has not read the Holy Quran in the original Arabic, one has not read it.

The notion that words and their meanings are arbitrary is a modern way to perceive language. Magic idolic communication and mythic symbolic expression perceive language as much more “motivated,” even sacred. The fact that a word is rarely uttered or written may indicate its spiritual and emotional importance for the magic community. Simple frequency counts of words cannot lead to an understanding of the meaning and power of language. The modern signalic perspective on language perceives it as an arbitrary code, a mere tool. Natural language is even seen as an inadequate tool because its concepts lack precision and restriction of meaning. So mathematics, a language invented for a specific purposes as when Isaac Newton invented calculus and computer programmers write code, is preferred (Kramer, 1997).

For a magic person words are not arbitrary or dissociated concepts. For a magic person, the utterance of a name is the same as the thing “represented.” A statue of Ganesha in India or Matsu in China, is not “a statue” but god. If you steal “the statue,” it is far more than the theft of an artifact. You have desecrated god and the emotional reaction of the faithful will be proportional to the offense. This is what I mean by idolic magic communication. Magic identity means that the thing (statue) and what it “represents” (in modernist spatial dualistic parlance) are identical. In magic incantation, there are strict prohibitions against uttering certain words because they invoke and evoke. They change reality. In the magic world of one-dimensional identity and even somewhat in the mythic world of two-dimensional ambivalent symbolic communication with its ambiguity between figural and literal polar meanings, language, thought, intent and reality are all one – identical. For a magic person, the wine and wafer literally are the blood and body of Christ. For a mythic person the essential quality of the object is ambiguous. And for a Modern, they are completely separate things.

If I steal a crucifix from the altar of a church I have not literally stolen god but yet it is not an entirely arbitrary object without emotional consequences either, like stealing a chair or some money from the church. Though crosses vary, its basic shape is not arbitrary. Churchgoers would never just decide to put a cube up on the altar. And money has no sacral dimension; not even in an ambivalent sense. Parishioners may debate what kind of cross they want; wooden or metal, tall or short, wall-hanging or altar top, a crucifix with a depicted body on it, a gothic style or contemporary. The cross is not totally arbitrary, but it is ambiguous. Emotions would run higher if a cube were put on the altar to replace the cross, than if a metal cross replaced the
wooden one on the altar. The cross is ambiguous. Not totally arbitrary but available to limited modification.

By contrast, stealing a magic holy relic from a Catholic cathedral may be a criminal offense but it is also certainly sacrilegious. It is utterly irrereplaceable – nonnegotiable. Stealing money from the collection plate is both a criminal and moral offense but it does not rise to the level of offense that stealing a one-of-a-kind, irreplaceable holy relic. For the holy relic is a power object. It is not a modern arbitrary sign nor a mythic symbol but a magic idolic object that is the actual hand or skull of a saint or a piece of the actual cross upon which The Christ was crucified. By contrast modernist monetary value has no permanent identity. Because it is utterly arbitrary, even more so than a cross, it can change representational forms from paper currency, to stocks and bonds, to gold or diamonds, to plastic credit cards, to commodities, to electronic pulses, et cetera.

The most profound aspects of identity are not arbitrary. They are not negotiable. They are not a matter of choice. They are magic and mythic in quality. And so, to change one aspect of one’s fundamental ethnic identity means to change them all because identity at its core is a holistic integrated magical phenomenon.

Dissociation involves disintegration. To give up one’s native language or religion is to change who one is fundamentally. Even to give up one’s traditional dress or hairstyle, such as the Muslim *hijab* or Sikh *Dastar* (turban) or the *oicho* (ginkgo leaf) style of *Chonmage* (topknot) worn by high ranking sumo wrestlers in Japan, can evoke powerful emotional reactions. Generally speaking, this is profoundly different from changing one’s legal citizenship. Changing the modern legal status of citizenship is less emotional. It is more secular temporal and legal than a manifestation of sacred permanence. In the magic world with its idolic communication there is no spatial thinking and therefore no fragmentation, and therefore no modernist separation of the sign and the signifier (Kramer, 1997). For the modern, words and their meanings are arbitrary. But to a person in a magic idolic attitude or, to a lesser degree, a mythic symbolic mindset, words are incantatory, powerful, serious; even sacred. To a magic person uttering the name of the devil is profoundly serious and will be met with intense emotional response.

Very conservative, traditional communities do not tolerate fluxing difference well. They are “tight knit.” A good aspect of modern spatialized thinking is the wiggle room between things, the “latitude” individuals give each other to express themselves and “follow their own drummer.” Arbitrariness, tolerance for deviation in modern societies means greater acceptance of many different lifestyles and ethnicities without harsh stigma because no one of them is regarded as sacred or immutable. Late modernism is characterized by pluralism and relativism. It is an irony of modernity that its strong tendency toward dissociation, toward carelessness, facilitates tolerance. Tolerance in a sense means that I really don’t care if you are black, Belgian, old, Jewish, have orange hair, sport a tattoo, or whatever, so long as you can do the job I need done and you don’t infringe on my own private sphere and self-expression. And so, modern multicultural and multietnic societies do not require immigrants to abandon who they are in order to be functionally fit and competent members of the society. In fact in magic societies tattoos and scarification are stylized, standardized, and shared. In magic communities tattoos are not expressions of personal choice and style. Instead, magic tattoos function to bind the individual to the group. Each tribe has its own insignia and body modifications such as unique styles of head binding and tattoos which have magic/spiritual significance, manifesting powers that protect as well as identify individuals as tribal members. By contrast in modern societies
tattoos are a matter of personal expression. People adorn themselves with personally selected if not designed tattoos to express their individuality.

In the great multicultural modern societies today diversity churns and displays itself. Adapting to such a destination as my new homeland does not necessitate that I completely cease to be who I was. However, there are those who argue that adaption and primary identity are mutually exclusive phenomena. And it is this claim Dr. Croucher and Dr. Cronn-Mills refute with data gathered in France and England.

According to the empirical research presented herein by Croucher and Cronn-Mills, in England and France many Muslims felt that Islamophobia was declining until the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. Following that event, Muslims in England and France (as well as the United States) felt a backlash and began to manifest what some have called a “siege mentality.” Ignorance of Islam in the Christian west is a problem. Many believe that all Arabs are Muslim and hence the racial profiling that often accompanies Islamophobic communicative traits and behaviors. But it is a fact that only about 20 percent of Arabs are Muslim with the rest claiming other religious affiliation including Christian. Also the vast majority of Muslims do not speak Arabic nor do they live in the Middle East but instead in nations far to the east in countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia. The vast majority of Muslims lead peaceful “normal” lives.

This book seeks to explore the causes and effects of Islamophobia and ways to ameliorate this irrational prejudice through communicative strategies and practices. To this end, this book presents the analysis of 191 interviews (106 self-identified Muslims -- 61 in France and 45 in Britain and 85 self-identified Christians -- 46 in France and 39 in Britain) gathered in two phases from 2005 to 2007. Each interview breeches the topic of the influence of Muslims on their host society’s cultural, political, and economic habits. Each interview gives a forum for Muslims and non-Muslims to reflect upon and express their feelings about the influence Islamic immigrants are having on English and French society. It is hoped that by doing so, social science will gain a better understanding of the nature of multicultural communication patterns in general and the specific difficulties people are having with coping with large-scale immigration and with necessarily sharing determination of their common futures in France and England. It is also hoped that these interviews will help all involved to acquire a more informed perspective and to gain access to each other’s feelings. The authors hope that a frank exchange of fears and hopes will help us all better understand each others’ common humanity and citizenship. The candid responses to their questions about the growing diversity of cultural and religious communities in these western European nations adds an enormously important element to intercultural and cross-cultural communication studies that has been woefully absent, namely religious differences and their effects on individual’s feelings and communicative behaviors within multicultural societies.

While some writers such as Gudykunst and Kim (2003) who are stuck in their own modernist perspective which basically sees culture as just a “parochial bias,” made up of nonsubstantive “intellectual distinctions and emotional defilements” (p. 385) promote assimilation via the “progressive disintegration” of the original self, we find this to be utterly unrealistic. Such writers speak of assimilation as being an “upward-forward” spiral of “positive growth” and “maturation” toward greater “mental health and adjustment”; an overall process they call “deculturation” characterized by the willful “unlearning” of the self (Gudykunst and Kim, 2003, pp. 380-385). Clearly, such authors do not understand the fundamental power of the sacred, the magic and mythic dimensions of being (Gebser, 1949 Ger./1985 Eng.; Eliade, 1957 Ger./1987 Eng.; Kramer, 1997, 2003). Given the obvious importance of religion (and language)
to ethnic identity and therefore inter-ethnic and intercultural communication dynamics, one can only surmise that writers avoid this topic (as well as ethnolinguistics) because it requires a great deal of study. The researchers in the field simply ignore the complexity of comparative religious studies in favor of overly simplistic explanations based on obsolete trait psychology, speaking of immigrants’ “adaptive predisposition” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 368-373) thus avoiding the rigorous study necessary to understanding intercultural relations. The presumption is that one’s psychology, one’s perceptions have no relationship to primary socialization as an ethnic and linguistic being.

The best explanation for this paucity of scholarly rigor is an avoidance of the demands placed on anyone who ventures into researching comparative cultures and civilizations. The daunting nature of the task is probably why much of intercultural and cross-cultural communication research never even mentions religion or ethnolinguistics, let alone historical context. As astounding as this is, it is the rather sad fact of the discipline. And that is why empirical work that investigates religious commitment and conviction and its role in maintaining ethnic identity and socio-cultural difference (meaning), such as offered in this book by Croucher and Cronn-Mills, is so rare and valuable. There simply is no substitute for scholarly rigor or dedicated fieldwork.

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