What Is a "Japanese"? Culture, Diversity, and Social Harmony in Japan

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WA AS MAGIC AND MYTHIC HARMONY

Wa is usually translated as "harmony." When non-Japanese scholars attempt to explain the "miracle" of Japan's economic success, they often refer to wa as the source of Japanese postwar economic achievement (e.g., E. G. Vogel's Japan as Number One). The Japanese seem to agree with this analysis. The translated versions of such books as Japan as Number One have sold well in Japan. Japanese highly value the virtue of wa (Umehara, 1981: 348). According to Umehara (1981: 348), politicians who do not appreciate wa are usually disqualified by public opinion. Is the concept of wa unique to Japanese? What does wa signify? We must begin at this point in order to unfold the relationship between "harmony," "power," "fidelity," and racial "integrity."

Prince Shotoku's Seventeen Article Constitution, the first constitution compiled in Japan around 600, stated the importance of wa in the first article. It says: "Wa o motte tatashi to shi, sakaraukoto naki to seyo" [Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored] (translated by William Aston, 1956, in The Nihongi). According to Umehara (1981: 348), this phrase has had more influence than any other on the Japanese people. Prince Shotoku was the first Japanese official to send a mission to China. He also studied Buddhism extensively. The Seventeen Article Constitution was based on the Buddhist principle of compassion. The second article denotes that one must respect the Buddha, his teachings, and the ones who preach them.

At the end of the 6th century A.D., several clans competed with each other to obtain power. Prince Shotoku resorted to the Buddhist principles of wa and compassion in order to rule the country (Umehara, 1981). Many scholars of Japanese history have pointed out that Prince Shotoku's idea of wa synthesized
and instituted the Confucian notion of harmony with Buddhist ideals (see Ume-
hara, 1981). In his scheme, however, Buddhist compassion was expressed and
practiced as an integral part of the imperial system. This is not unusual, since
Buddhism, from its inception, has ventured to advise rulers on how to govern.
Given Prince Shotoku’s perspective and interests, however, compassion did not
extend beyond the system. Compassion was to be instituted and systematized.
As part of the system, by definition, it could not be extended to those “outside.”
Conversely, the sacred system was to be kept uncorrupted, pure, (uniformally
consistent and coherent). The rest of Article One reinforces this scheme by
articulating the importance of maintaining the system based on Confucian pa-
triarcal principles. It says:

All men are influenced by partisanship, and there are few who are intelligent. Hence
there are some who disobey their lords and fathers, and who maintain feuds with the
neighboring villages. But when those above are harmonious and those below are friendly,
and there is concord in the discussion of business, right views of things spontaneously
gain acceptance. Then what is there which cannot be accomplished? (Aston, 1956: 41)

Articles Three, Four, and Twelve explicitly state the superiority of the emperor’s
system and his duty to maintain the system, as well as the peoples’ duty to
maintain the system. The duty of maintenance implies obedience to the rules.
According to Prince Shotoku, compassion and harmony are identical with the
imperial system. Since his constitution established this order, order and orders
(articles) are identical. Order is made, as if by magic.

The concept of wa, or harmony, that Prince Shotoku had in mind was more
specifically a state of “order” manifested as the imperial system. He required
that people pay respect to the emperor so that the “order,” or the hierarchy of
the system, namely, wa, would be maintained. In this system, people must
blindly follow. Any other path of action could only lead to disorder, disharmony,
and suffering. “Egoless” self-effacement is the prerequisite for such a structure
(Gebser, 1949 Ger.1985 Eng.). Peace and tranquility exist when contention is
absent. In other words, harmony is sustained through egoless souls. Japan,
as the egoless extended family of ie, with the emperor as head, was first articulated
by Prince Shotoku’s Seventeen Article Constitution. This constitution instituted
a “perspectival” legal articulation of order. It is essentially a Confucian version
of proto-perspectivity.

Ego, or awareness of self, is irrelevant to members of ie (Ikeda, 1992). The
purpose for each member of ie is to preserve ie, not to express or achieve
individual desires. “Political” marriages are, for example, not “sacrifices,” but
necessities in the “mythic” world. Mythic people simply accept arranged marri-
ages. Jean Gebser (1985) characterized mythic consciousness as an egoless
gests a state in which man lacks self-identity: he belongs to a unit, such as a
tribe or communal group, where the emphasis is not yet on the person but on
and pre-perspectival people may have a consciousness mutation from a predominantly emotional mythic world to a predominantly perspectival world of rational order. He set into motion the formalization of a conical state structure with himself (the emperor) at the top and lower ranks as "legal-officials," which were then used to control the populace. This identity flexibility disappeared. As the Jews discovered in Nazi Germany, this identity flexibility disappeared. As the Jews discovered in Nazi Germany, record keeping is equal to identity keeping.

In the modern period, the authority's effort to legally create "others," and to confine them, was strengthened. Legal definition became a far less permeable barrier than older normative distinctions had been. Since the buraku look like everybody else, before spatial segregation and legal documentation, they could take new occupations and blend in. But after administrative definition was imposed, this identity flexibility disappeared. As the Jews discovered in Nazi Germany, record keeping is equal to identity keeping.

Modern "typographic" (to quote McLuhan, 1962) humanity seeks security in the stable system, which is established by histories and bureaucracies that survey and keep track of individuals. For most predominantly mythic societies, the first indication of perspectivism is manifested by a rising emphasis on literacy and record keeping, which almost always involves a small intelligentsia that are usually religious scholars, because they are the only people who can read and write (report). For instance, many European medieval paintings depict inquisitorial punishment and judgment-day proceedings, including a scribe dutifully recording the confessions of the condemned and consulting the book of the dead. Recording fixes identity. You are what you do, and although your actions pass, your identity does not. For instance, once someone is identified as a felon, a dishonorable discharge, or "bad credit risk" in a bureaucratic world, it is very difficult to escape such an identity (see Chapter 3 about IQ and educational tracking).
Modernity expresses anxiety in the face of change (time) by systematizing and fixing relationships. It makes them "legal," and law transcends or "arrests" (criminal) time. The Nazi and Soviet systems are good examples of centralized drive to create the "new modern industrial man." Their bureaucracies and feedback surveillance channels are legendary. Empire relies on information storage and transmission.

Homogeneity Equals Stability

The histories of the buraku people, Ainu, and Koreans in Japan demonstrate the power of administrative systematization combined with blood-based prejudices. The myth of Japan as a homogeneous society is a fiction created to promulgate the "uniqueness" of "Japanese" culture. Such a fictitious story has hidden Japan's cultural history of borrowing (especially from China and Korea), and also its racial/ethnic problems, from the rest of the world. Even many "Japanese" people do not know the racial/ethnic problems of their own country. They may think the problem of Koreans in Japan is somehow different (less sinister) than racial problems in the United States. Although they may be aware of "class" or "status" discrimination against buraku people, they regard it as different from racial/ethnic problems generally. Many "Japanese" do believe that they are unique and special, even in their way of being unique. This attitude is manifested in the speeches of the ex-prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and the remarks of other politicians.

For example, Nakasone has expressed the claim to superiority by reference to the racial homogeneity of Japan (Dower, 1986: 315). His remarks offended Japan's minority groups, especially the Ainu. Nakasone denied the existence of minorities, and therefore the possibility of discrimination in Japan. Furthermore, he was severely criticized by Americans when he associated America's minority populations with inferior intellectual, qua educational performance. Japan is not immune to racial/ethnic problems. Discrimination against buraku people is, for instance, a manifestation of power which defines a group of people as inferior.

The existence of legal "others" is a necessity for perspectival social order to exist. Such an order embodies a linear ratio (like a variable) whereby the lower one goes the farther one is from power. Along a single axis, one cannot lose Japanese identity and yet keep power. Perspectival authority offers the "others" as a "reason," as a rationale, for maintaining the order. In the modern world, authority offers "reasons" why "others" should be discriminated against.

CONTROL OF "OTHERS"

The early modern period of Japan was characterized by an explicit (exter­gorized logic) and rigid class society. While the class system included some flexibility in the Middle Ages, it became solidified by explicit law in the Edo period (1603–1867).

Control of Buraku People in the Edo Period

Once people were categorized or "cast" as the lowest in the community (so-called buraku) based on their occupation, their family lines could not escape. The occupational line and the family line were inseparable. The lowest cast consisted of two branches according to occupation: eta and hinin. Eta included those who dealt with animal skins and dead people.4 Hinin were criminals, vagabonds, or beggars. Under the rigid system of status control, the number of hinin, who violated the order of status and therefore had their status lowered as such, increased (Suginohara, 1982: 132). Eta and hinin were considered to be outcasts by the Tokugawa administration. That is, as outside of the formal "cast" system (warriors, farmers, artisans, and merchants), and as such, as "non-humans." And yet, their status as outcasts depended on the existence of the cast system. Thus, they were defined by, and were part of, the system.

The Tokugawa administration forced them to live in certain areas by systematically segregating them from the rest of the community. This class system was established in order to rule the majority of people, mainly farmers, who supplied the bulk of the labor force for the economy. The "other" is an opiate, and so long as the farmers believed that someone was less human than they, the farmers were willing to participate, even proudly, in the very system that exploited them. The government knew the psychology of the farmer cast, and deluded them into believing that they were not the "bottom" of society, and to feel "better."

Eta and Hinin were necessary components of the system. The Tokugawa government used them to alleviate the dissatisfaction and complaints of the masses (mainly farmers) and to avoid revolt by removing the pretense (Suginohara, 1982: 12). Manipulating powers have long understood that satisfaction is a relative phenomenon.

The Tokugawa administration utilized Buddhist sects in order to strengthen the feudal system (Matsushita, 1985: 128; Taniguchi, 1985: 230; Teraki, 1984: 57). In 1664, the Tokugawa Shogunate ordered feudal lords to compile the Shumon-cho (sect book) every year. Sect books constituted cybernetic feedback mechanisms in the system, enabling control. Such bureaucratic tools helped the government monitor the population, including the group status of individuals. These survey instruments also tied people to certain Buddhist sects. People had to belong to their danna-dera (family temples) and register as its terako (children of the temple). In the middle of the Edo period, control over the buraku people was strengthened. In 1712, "each feudal clan eliminated them [the buraku people] from the Shumon-cho" (sect book). All the villagers where registered in their Danna-dera (family temples), and began to prepare a separate book for registering the 'humble people' exclusively" (Suginohara, 1982: 15–16).

Buddhist sects not only helped the government promote discrimination against the buraku people, but also organized themselves to facilitate the system. Each Buddhist sect built distinctive temples for the buraku people and drove them
away from other temples (Taniguchi, 1985: 232; Teraki, 1993: 141–144). The buraku temples were called derogatory names such as eji (a polluted temple) (Taniguchi, 1985: 232–233; Teraki, 1993: 141–144). Even after death, the Buddhist temples discriminated against the buraku people by giving them derogatory kaimyo, or posthumous Buddhist names (Taniguchi, 1985: 224). Government authority and religious authority were organized into a mutually supportive (harmonious) system of control and maintenance.

The Tokugawa government justified the formation of the buraku people as “outcast,” by using the Buddhist/Shintoist concept of “pollution,” which was a widely held belief among “Japanese” people (Teraki, 1993: 96–97). Since the Ancient period, when Buddhist beliefs spread through “Japanese” society, contact with death was to be avoided. Buddhist teachings prohibited people from taking any life. Prior to the Nara period (A.D. 645–794), the location of the imperial capital was frequently moved “due to the emperor’s death. In Buddhism, death was associated with pollution. The Buddhist notion of pollution was then combined with Shintoist notions of imi (taboo) and kegare (pollution) which were also related to human death. “Japanese” people believed the Buddhist/Shintoist doctrine of “pollution,” and avoided contact with death, and by association, the buraku people. This faith was also manifested as elaborate purification rituals.

The notion of pollution came to include the avoidance of contact with the bodies of dead animals. This idea further extended to the belief that leather work and eating meat constituted pollution (Neary, 1989: 13). Thus, eta, the name for leather workers, came to denote “polluted” and “inferior.” Until the Tokugawa period, however, such people were not systematically separated from the rest of the people as a policy. Although people who dealt with “death” tended to be inferiorized before the Tokugawa period, it was possible for them to move out from such communities and engage in different occupations. However, the Tokugawa administration made people believe that “being polluted” was an inherent characteristic of the buraku people. In other words, the administration utilized the myth of pollution in order to create and control the buraku people as instruments of social order. The Tokugawa administration perspectively transformed a de facto status into a de jure status which was recorded and thus fixated and rationalized “by definition.”

NATURALLY INFERIOR

The Buddhist/Shintoist belief in the doctrine of human “pollution” came from the fear of death. People fear the uncontrollable. Death is inevitable and uncontrollable. Death is a part of nature. Civilization is born as a struggle to control nature (Gebser, 1985). When humans came to believe that nature was something different from themselves, the “perfect” harmony between human-kind and nature (identity) was disturbed. Prior to the emergent consciousness of nature, the world is spaceless and timeless. The universe has no distinctions.

For instance, the difference between the sea and sky, is not clear in the story of Chuang Tzu’s fish, K’un, which becomes a bird “P’eng,” and heads for the Lake of Heaven.

In the Northern Ocean there is a fish called Kun which is many thousand li in size. It changes into a bird named Peng whose back is many thousand li in breadth. When it rises and flies, its wings are like clouds filling the sky. When this bird moves across the ocean it heads for the South Sea, the Celestial Lake. (Chuang Tzu, 1974, p. 5)

Gebser (1985) called this spaceless/timeless world the archaic structure of consciousness. Archaic consciousness is one of such profound and simple identity that the “harmony” of man and the cosmos is not conceivable as such, but simply is the case. “Harmony” cannot be realized until “disharmony” is experienced.

With the awareness of the difference between humans and nature, human beings begin to struggle. This is the beginning of power in the human sense. This struggle is articulated as control of cosmic forces (division between the natural and supernatural is not manifested until the perspectival mutation). Once humans try to control nature, the wholeness of the world begins to fragment. “The more man released himself from the whole, becoming conscious of himself, the more he began to be an individual” (Gebser, 1985: 46).

For magic people, nature is not yet separated from culture and so neither exist as such. The additional fracture between nature and supernature is an expression of the modern world. Magic people struggle to control the world by using magic (Gebser, 1985). Perspectival moderns use technology (material magic). Magic people try to manipulate (usually by appeasement) the forces (later called “laws”) of the world by conducting rituals. During the magic ritual, a magic person identifies him/herself with “nature.” He or she experiences point-like-unity, in which an aspect of the world “possesses” him or her, or vice versa. But “possession” (which is a unidirectional modern idea) is not a totally satisfactory concept for describing magic at-onement. Magic is expressed audually. Chants and magic “spells” must be spoken to call into being, to make things happen. Gebser (1985: 46) has traced the shared etymology of “make,” “might,” “machine,” and “magic” to “mag(h),” a Greek word of Persian origin, which means “power.” Definitions call into being (concerning operational definitions, see the Preface in Gebser, 1985). Auditory vibrations merge with the hearer and are not so directional as sight. One can look away but not hear away (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967: 111; Gadamer, 1975: 454). While the archaic person does not divide the senses into dis creet types of data, they stress touch and smell. Mythic people stress audition, while the perspectival stresses vision.

Vision generates space and separation leading to nature as “other,” available for indiscriminate conquest. A magic person does not “conquer” an external and opposing “nature,” but influences natural forces by identifying his or her
will with them. They move together as one. In the hunt dance, the magic person who dons the skin of the antelope and eats its flesh becomes the antelope. Even modern technologists recognize that the laws of nature are unbreakable, and so one must conform to them in order to manipulate them. In the case of the Pygmies' hunting rite, a "real" buffalo and one painted on a cave wall, as well as a ray of sunlight and an arrow, merge as a unity, fulfilling the magic cycle of killing in order to live. When the first ray of sunlight strikes the painting, the buffalo is already dead. The hunt is a process of sacred gathering. The hunting rite is sacred and very emotional because the buffalo is, if not a superior, at least an equal to the human. They are "brothers" (Campbell and Moyers, 1988).

In the mythic structure of consciousness, separation between humans and nature is more obvious. The mythic universe consists of complementing polarities such as day and night, man and woman, and so on. The distinction between mythic polarities is not clearly resolved or defined. Mythic polarities are ambiguous, not distinctly oppositional as in modern dialectical "positions." For example, the Chinese symbol, Tai-Ki or Tai-Ji, indicates that polar "differences" include each other. Polarities articulate mythic harmony. Harmony with, not conquest of, is the mythic way. But, mythic harmony is possible only because magic identity has dissolved somewhat. Disharmony is an ever-present potential.

In the mythic world, death is "pollution," but it is still intertwined in a cycle with life. Death can be controlled through such mythic rituals as oharai (purification).

Myth does not disappear in the perspectival world, but manifests in a different form, according to the structural criteria of mental-rationality. In the modern perspectival world, myth can be used as a tool in a calculated strategy for the purpose of control. An ideologue need not believe in, or identify with, a narrative (reality) to use it masterfully. In the Western world, the magic of "blood" is superceded (not eliminated) by mythic tradition, which in turn is superceded by genetics in the age of the Enlightenment. Vision is emphasized (Kramer, 1992). The Enlightenment is a discursive formation of redefinitions which do not eliminate but alter the meaning of magic and mythic modes of being. They are newly positioned as mysticism, superstition, and blood-based power legitimation. With the emergence of modern arbitrariness, legitimation of aristocratic power via blood is superceded by dialogical politics and the rhetorical merit of policy deliberation. In the modern world, some mythic and magic phenomena are reduced to mere contingencies, and erroneous ones to boot, thus stripping them of their ontological force. But the sacrality and emotion of blood is not so easily redefined.

The emerging awareness of the individual self has not enabled people to escape entirely from the "natural" fatalism of blood-based power legitimation. It merely redefined it as genetic fatalism, which is even more powerfully convincing since it is rational. Individualism clarified and freed the self from collectivistic traditionism, but entrapped it in a structure of meritocracy and isolation (see Chapter 3).

A different perspectival version of responsibility emerged. It has descended upon the slim shoulders of the lone self with devastating consequences. Materialism has deployed the embodied self in space, giving birth to the related problems of communication and alienation. Existentialism is an essentially modern doctrine. A "new" social order, democracy, was established based on the mental power of the rational individual. In such a society, the more rationally one thinks, the more (s)he can gain power. Knowledge is equated with power. A new definition of competence emerges. A competent person, in modern (post-feudal) Japan as elsewhere, has brain power and thinks rationally, meaning systematically (by the rules). A "new" hierarchy was built based on the ability to think this way. In the West, this social order initially defined blacks, orientals, women, children, and the handicapped as irrationally incompetent, excluding them from access to power.

Since modern power is based on rule-guided thinking, if one is not educated in the rules, then one cannot think ("well"). Mental-rational power is unlike brute force, which is not dependent on access to institutional structure. Since education (or socialization into the rules of thinking) is equated with power/privilege, then education is both the source and result of privilege. The resources of education are not wasted on those deemed unable or unfit. If one cannot get an education, then one cannot become capable (smart), and since one is not smart, one cannot get an education. This is the vicious circle of modern technocratic power, especially in the Third World where gaps in power are very pronounced. The "unwashed masses" are regarded as "subhumans." Responsibility for their condition is shifted, via the ideology of individualism, to the self. They are blamed for their plight. Blaming the victim is a common rationale for maintaining the modern order. But a fallacy arises here. While the rich and powerful like to take responsibility for their own good fortune, at the same time they like to consider the poor as inherently deficient ("bad seed"). But, according to the ideology of genetic superiority, the rich cannot claim responsibility for their good fortune because they acknowledge that they had no control over the selection of their own genes. And yet they blame the poor for somehow being responsible for their "deficient" genetic makeup.

Thus is born the decontextualized bootstrap theory of innate power/privilege. "They" are subhuman because "they" are subhuman, and because they are subhuman they will never change. This is the tautological reasoning of genetic determinism. Those who know how to, or have the characteristics that enable them to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, are already "up." By dint of their innate superiority, they have bootstraps (the ability to rise by themselves). They have "grit," "character," "drive," "aggression," "appetite," "shrewd instincts," and so forth. But the superior are always already superior, so the bootstraps are never used, and those who need the bootstraps (the innate drive, grit, talent, intelligence) do not have them. Bootstrapping is an innate
quality. Some have what it takes and others do not. Yet those who are at the bottom of the system are continually told: (A) you are down there because of innate inadequacy, you have no bootstraps, and (B) I, the superior one, will only hurt (spoil) you if I help you, so use your bootstraps (which I just told you that you do not have). In order to justify and engineer such a “new” social order based on the individual, the scientific discourse of genetics continues to be used. The Enlightenment scientists rationalized that “subhumans” were genetically inferior, and behaviorally irrational (of course, according to the criteria they devised). They created intelligence/power in their own image (see Chapter 3). How convenient. And through the discourse of science and law, what they have created by legal-rational and operational definition appears “natural,” and as such, beyond question.

The idea of human “pollution,” based on occupational behavior, is a vicious circle, but apparently not pure or vicious enough. In feudal Japan, *buraku* identity was tightly defined, as only *buraku* dealt with corpses and they did so because they were *buraku*. But this identity was still escapable, still loose, for it existed only at the level of *de facto* identity. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, Japan was centralized and stabilized as a national system. In the process of clarifying and legalizing life (tightening up identities and definitions) the *de facto* identity of the *buraku* became *de jure*. *Buraku* characteristics became legally defined (rationalized) as *inherent*. Thus, the plus-mutualistic veneer of mental-rationality was laid over the magic of blood-based identity. To stray from one’s ghetto or occupation became punishable by law. The power of state organization was brought to bare on the enforcement of identity. What had been custom was reinforced by state power.

As the Tokugawa authority authored the new reality (the new order) and daily life was organized, discrimination against the *buraku* people became formalized, instituted as an integral part of the new social hierarchy. As such, their condition became fixed, condemning generation after generation of *buraku* to the bottom of social space. Japanese modernity, like Western modernity, relegated entire groups to occupying niches in a naturalized structure. The Tokugawa government achieved this by creating a “new” myth that the *buraku* people were *genetic* (no longer spiritual) pollution. Since modernization was threatening the old rationale, a new, more powerful one was established. So it is that years later, Japanese fascists and Nazis would be soul mates.

This myth created an atmosphere of strong, newly corroborated and legitimized (via Western objective method) discrimination which added to “Japanese” people’s previously dominant magic notion of protecting the purity of their blood lines and mythic hatred of *buraku* as “traditionally” evil. The Tokugawa government outlawed intermarriages between *buraku* and non-*buraku* people. Even *buraku* people tended to believe the new bureaucratic (systematic) discourse about themselves and others. Bureaucracy is “objective,” because once established, it is “disinterested.” It is automated, running unconsciously. Faced with such organizational might, the *buraku* people internalized this legit-

**Ainu as Indigenous “Japanese”**

In the middle of the Civil War period in Japan, the dualistic structure of oppressor and oppressed was exported to Hokkaido, the most northerly of Japan’s four main islands. Suppression of the Ainu people* extends back to the middle of the fifteenth century when the Matsumae clan moved to Hokkaido after being defeated by a rival clan elsewhere. The leader of the Matsumae clan became the ruler of Hokkaido. Prior to this, none of Japan’s ruling class had settled in Hokkaido, although some “historical” stories (e.g., Kojiki, Nihon-shoki, etc.) reported that Japanese troops conquered the Ainu people in ancient times. Even though prewar “Japanese” history textbooks included such stories, there is no evidence to support them (Sarashina, 1970). These textbooks were made for the purpose of glorifying Japan as the emperor’s family (Sarashina, 1970).

The history of the Ainu is somewhat similar to that of Native Americans. At first, the Ainu resisted the new ruler. Some Ainu oral stories, and the Matsumae clan’s documents, recall and record several severe battles between the Ainu people and the invaders. After loosing several battles, the Ainu people were enslaved.

The Tokugawa government did not show much interest in Hokkaido until the end of the seventeenth century, when it began to govern Hokkaido directly in 1799. In terms of productivity, Hokkaido was not an attractive land to the Tokugawa government. However, Russian battleships appeared in the coastal waters of Hokkaido, motivating the Tokugawa government to establish a strong sovereign presence there in 1800. Since direct rule of the Ainu people by the Tokugawa administration, the Ainu people have been forced to live like “Japanese.” They were forced to engage in farming. The sudden shift from hunting to agricultural culture, however, threatened their ability to survive.

Besides this, the Ainu people were subjected to various kinds of oppression, such as being cheated, being forced to engage in hard labor, and so forth (Kayano, 1994; Sarashina, 1970). As a result, the number of the Ainu dropped dra-
matically in the early 1800s (Sarashina, 1970: 116–117). The attempt to force the Ainu to adapt to Japanese ways nearly exterminated them, not only in terms of their cultural identity, but physically. Adaptation is either demanded by environmental forces or cultural domination, and the difference between ethnic and “physical” difference is erased. To exterminate one means to exterminate the other.

CONTROL OF “OTHERS” IN THE MODERN PERIOD

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Ainu and buraku people were legally considered heimin, or commoners. Under the new imperial system of Meiji, all “Japanese” people became the emperor’s children. Theoretically, the statuses of eta and hinin were abandoned and the Ainu people became “Japanese citizens.” However, discrimination against such people did not disappear. For instance, buraku people were called shin-heimin (new commoner) or some other terms, which were used to segregate and ridicule them (Kuboi, 1993: 12; Namamoto, 1991: 100–110). The wording of the Ainu “protection law” (established in 1899) itself expresses discrimination against the Ainu (“Hachiju Yonin Ga,” 1995). The law is called kyu dojin hogo ho (Indigenous Persons Protection Act). Dojin (indigenous persons) implies savage, uncivilized, and connotes inferiority. Furthermore, this law was established without any consultation with the Ainu (Kayano, 1994: 30). The law was enacted in 1995.

In the process of forming a “strong” nation, minority groups were forced to lead “less-than-human” lives. In order to compete with Western nations, Japan used these minority groups as labor to “westernize” and capitalize Japan. The Ainu people were forced to engage in agriculture so that arable land in Hokkaido could expand. The new capitalist system made “minor” and “poor” people unable to escape from oppressive conditions. Imperial Japan ignored minority groups, legally confining them to the status of “minority.” This legal status supposedly gave the Ainu “nominal emancipation.” After “emancipating” them, the authorities denied their existence.

Koreans in Japan

Through the process of imperial expansion, Japan created another minority group, Koreans in Japan. By the end of the nineteenth century, Western countries competed with each other for domination in Asia. As an emerging nation (economically and militarily), Japan wanted to become one of the world’s “great powers.” In order to fulfill its wish, Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Because of Japan’s success in the Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), Japan succeeded in establishing its sovereignty over Korea without experiencing much resistance. The imposition of a colonial economy destroyed the traditional Korean agricultural life. Weiner (1994: 43) writes: “With the introduction of new market relations and the incorporation of Korean agriculture within the wider economic system of the Japanese empire, the subsistence agriculturalist came under intense pressure.” When a large-scale land survey was conducted, many illiterate farmers lost their land. Also, many farmers increased their debts because of their inability to cope with the new monetary system. In order to survive, many Koreans moved to Japan and engaged in low-wage industrial labor. From 1928 to 1936, Koreans working in manual labor in Japan increased steadily from 171,031 to 289,727 (Pak, 1957: 13; Weiner, 1994: 128). During the same period the number of unemployed Koreans in Japan increased from 43,901 in 1928, to 241,369 in 1936, and Koreans in prison also increased from 323 to 2,341 (Pak, 1957: 13; Weiner, 1994: 128). Virtually no Korean held a salaried, let alone professional position.

Originally, most Korean immigrants did not speak Japanese; thus, they were at a great disadvantage and were easily exploited. They were inevitably forced to take jobs that Japanese did not want. They also received lower wages and sometimes even no payment (especially those who were brought to Japan to alleviate the labor shortage under the war regime) (Michell, 1981: 115; Nakatsuka, 1991: 107).

Koreans in Japan have also been used as scapegoats. Government annual reports from 1933 to 1942 describe Koreans as an inferior ethnic group (Michell, 1981: 113). The 1933 report, for example, states that most Koreans coming to Japan had no skills, were illiterate in both Japanese and Korean, were vulgar and emotional, and liked arguing and fighting (Michell, 1981: 113). The report concluded that the increased crime rate had been a result of an increase in Korean immigration (Michell, 1981: 113). The 1933 annual report reveals that the Japanese government had intended to place Koreans in a lower position than Japanese, and to use them as scapegoats to alleviate complaints from poor Japanese citizens. In those days, the lives of most Japanese people were not easy. They, too, were severely exploited in order to make a “strong” nation. The government needed a scapegoat in order to stabilize the country. In Japan, stability has meant harmony. Harmony exists when everyone stays in his place within the system. Harmony has been the key to national strength. Neither stability nor harmony necessarily has anything to do with justice.

From the beginning of the annexation of Korea, the Japanese government initiated the policy of doka seisaku (assimilation). It was apparent that the Japanese government wanted to control Koreans by denying their traditional culture and attempting to eliminate their Korean identity by imposing upon them a new, but also less than, “Japanese” identity. Ueda (1995: 196–197) called Japan’s colonization policy “the spiritual genocide of their ethnicity.” Although Koreans were forced to be Japanese-like, they could never be the same. They were legally distinct from Japanese. They were registered in Korea, even if they lived in Japan. It was illegal for them to transfer their registration (koseki) to Japan. They did not have the right to vote. In short, they did not have full citizenship in either Korea or Japan. The Japanese government justified this situation under the policy of assimilation by promulgating the idea that Koreans constituted an
inferior ethnic group (Iguchi, 1991: 74). Weiner (1994: 211) called this policy of assimilation a manifestation of “Social-Darwinist assumptions of empire and colonial expansion.” Equilibrium, or status quo, was maintained through the feedback mechanisms of bureaucratic surveillance.

The policy of assimilation was strengthened during World War II. At that time, a series of policies called naisen itai (Unity of Japanese and Koreans) was implemented to facilitate control of Koreans. The Japanese government had to make Koreans the children of the emperor (kominka seisaku) in order to fight against the Allied Forces. They were forced to have Japanese names, visit shrines and pay respect to the emperor, bow to the emperor’s residence, and so forth. But they remained the stepchildren of the Japanese family.

Under the slogans of daito kyoeki (co-prosperity of East Asia) and hokkai ichiu (unity of the whole world), Japan invaded other Asian countries. Perspectival mentality was manifested in slogans that justified the military expansion and colonial conquests of the era. These slogans were effective in uniting the “Japanese” people and deluding them into trying to make the world a single family under the emperor. The mythic awareness of wa was thus used for this perspectival purpose, which is consistent with the notion of wa used in postwar Japan.

**UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY: “WA-ISM”**

Since World War II, the prevalent notion that Japan is a “unique” country has blurred Japan’s sense of responsibility for the war (Yamaguchi, 1994). The uniqueness of Japan is often associated with the concept of wa, or harmony. World order (unification) was equated with “harmony.” One of the definitions of wa is “Japan.” Harmonious unity came to be seen as a cultural response to Western duality (Kato, 1990). Kato (1990) has proposed “wa-ism” as an alternative modernism to the Western ideology of dualism. Many of Japan’s leading scholars, including Umehara (1990), Saeki, Hirakawa, and Miyata (1990), present a similar perspective as Kato (see Yuasa, 1993). Kato (1990) argues that “wa-ism” (the Japanese ideology of harmony) is superior to Western culture. But, as pointed out, this form of harmony presumes disharmony, which, ironically, must be suppressed. The cause of harmony justifies the other, and at the same time, justifies seeing difference as dangerous.

“Wa-ism” is not new. Furthermore, it, too, is dualistic. The idea that Japan should unite the rest of the world, to make it over in its own image, coincides with the slogan, hokkai ichiu or the principle of co-prosperity. Wa, or harmony, is (in this sense) a manifestation of deficient mythic consciousness. It presents a duality between Japan and everyone else. And like most ideological proclamations, the home culture, religion, metaphysics, science, whatever, is almost always privileged as the best, if not only, true and good version of Reality. The promotion of hokkai ichiu is similar to the ideologies of Afro-centrism and pan-Africanism promoted by many Westernized black nationalists (usually left He-
extremely difficult for them to work at prestigious corporations. According to a survey conducted by Osaka Zainichi Chosenjin no Jinben o Mamoruki in 1984, 173 out of 251 companies refused to answer the question inquiring as to the number of Koreans they employ (Pak, 1991: 216). The researchers concluded that most of the companies that did not respond are first-rate ones, and that it could be assumed that these companies have a policy of not recruiting Koreans (Pak, 1991: 216).

Discriminatory treatment of Korean people in Japan is mirrored by the treatment of foreign workers, whose numbers increased sharply during the latter half of the 1980s. Since many foreign workers are illegal, they work at very low wages and without any protection. They are widely discriminated against. For example, they have had difficulty securing accommodations because landlords hesitate to rent to foreigners. Also, some political rhetoric is quite discriminatory against foreigners. For instance, the mayor of Kawasaki joked that dark-skinned Asian immigrant workers pose a danger because they are “difficult to see at night” (Oblas, 1995). Concerning the problem of foreign prostitutes in Tokyo, the justice minister equated prostitutes with black Americans and alleged that they both destroy good neighborhoods (Oblas, 1995). Foreigners are “others” or “outsiders” in Japan. “Others,” including the buraku people, the Ainu, and Koreans in Japan are not widely appreciated in Japan. However, an indication of integral consciousness has emerged through the process of demythologizing the faith in pure-blood identity in Japan.

DEMYTHOLOGIZING BLOOD

At the end of World War II, Japan’s unconditional surrender changed the identity of the “Japanese” (Ikeda, 1992). One of the conditions of the surrender was the requirement that the emperor renounce his “divinity.” Until the end of the war, the emperor was a god who blended “in his person its [Japan’s] power and its mercy” (Nitobe, 1905). At a fundamentally magic level, the emperor, Japan, and were identical. All true “Japanese” were the children of the emperor. They identified themselves only in relation to the emperor. After the war the emperor was no longer a god/father-of-the-country. Japan lost the foundation of its mythical and magical unity. “Japanese” began to abandon their faith in blood. At the same time, the perspectival awareness of individual ego has emerged. But perhaps Ainu and Koreans in Japan have not.

Resistance by minority groups against oppressive authority has become much stronger than it had been before the war. Everywhere, the call for individual rights has dramatically increased. In the latter half of the 1960s, many “Japanese” began to be more sympathetic toward Koreans in Japan, the buraku people, the Ainu, and others. This new awareness emerged along with a more liberal attitude toward the environment and social problems caused by rapid economic growth and industrialization. People began to realize that rapid capitalization and modernization were not without drawbacks. According to Yun (1987: 14–15), around 1970, various citizens groups began to push anti-discrimination issues. In the 1970s, the number of publications about Korea increased dramatically. A “Korean boom” resulted (Yun, 1987: 15). Also, around the same time, many universities began to offer Korean language courses (“Chosen-go Towa,” 1984). In the 1970s, Japan was pressured by international opinion into accepting “boat people,” which led to legal reforms concerning the status of foreigners (Tanaka, 1995: 155–174). The immigration law enacted in 1982 guaranteed the status of “permanent resident” for Koreans in Japan, and helped to stabilize their situation. In 1992, the law admitted that Koreans in Japan were exempted from mandatory fingerprinting. However, other alien residents who stay in Japan for more than a year still have to have their fingerprints kept on file.

After 1982, Koreans were able to receive various welfare benefits including pensions. However, their situation is not exactly the same as that for “Japanese” (the fukushi nenkin or welfare pension, for example, is not applicable to Koreans in Japan). In the 1990s, an increasing number of people have begun to argue that Koreans should be given the right to vote, and that they should be able to participate in national athletic competitions.

The United Nations pronounced 1992 the “year of indigenous peoples.” This helped advance human rights for the Ainu. The Asahi Shimbun reported on December 3, 1995, that more than 70 percent of the congressmen in the National Diet realized the necessity for a new law governing Ainu affairs (instead of the old “Indigenous Persons Protection Act”).

Discrimination against buraku people was reduced as a result of the new legislation. However, buraku communities still suffer from higher crime and poverty rates than other communities (Kristof, 1995: A1, A8). In some opinion polls, almost two-thirds of buraku people answered that they have never experienced discrimination; about 73 percent currently marry non-buraku people; and most of them deny the possibility that the Japanese police might treat buraku people unfairly (Kristof, 1995: A1).

With increased numbers of foreign workers, general interest in foreigners has heightened. For example, in the Gifu prefecture, the town of Nakatsugawa welcomed many “Japanese” Brazilian workers, and people in Nakatsugawa showed great interest in learning Portuguese (Personal communication, November 2, 1995). However, this may be because they see them as really “Japanese,” by blood. Foreign workers from India and the Middle East are not so well received.

In the past, the Japanese educational system was notorious for being closed and exclusive. Although there is criticism that “Japanese” people only show sympathy, not empathy, and that their interaction with foreign workers is “one-way,” they have begun to enjoy interacting with “something different,” on an everyday basis. Since 1988, the Ministry of Education has been extending one-year contracts to non-licensed teachers, to teach in elementary, junior high, and high schools. These teachers include non-Japanese teaching English, French cooking, music, painting, and other subjects from a distinctly foreign perspec-
tive. Such teachers numbered over 2,000 in 1994 ("Menkyo nakutemo," 1995: 31). Universities and colleges are also gradually changing. They have begun to accept faculty who have obtained advanced degrees in foreign countries. The Japanese educational system is changing into a more flexible system (Yun, 1987: 41). Also, the number of intercultural marriages is steadily increasing, which shows a shift in attitude regarding race and ethnic purity. From 1965 to 1991, the number of Japanese men married to non-Japanese women increased from 1,067 to 19,096, and for Japanese women married to non-Japanese men it rose from 3,989 to 6,063.

However, enthusiasm for what seemed to be progress in racial and ethnic tolerance during the 1970s and 1980s is tempered by the fact that according to Japan’s Health and Welfare Ministry, the divorce rate among marriages between Japanese men and Chinese, Filipina, and Thai women rose sharply from 2,322 in 1992 to 2,843 in 1994—a 22 percent increase (Barr, 1996: 8). According to Mizuho Matsuda, director of a church- and city-sponsored shelter for Asian women in Tokyo called "HELP," many of the men involved in "foreign marriages" were looking for women who were willing to perform "traditional roles" and were presumed to be "more docile" than Japanese women, "who are becoming very strong," including becoming more economically independent (quoted by Barr, 1996: 8; also see The Outnation: A Search for the Soul of Japan by Jonathan Rauch, 1992; and Pink Samurai: Love, Marriage and Sex in Contemporary Japan by N. Bornoff, 1991). By 1990, roughly 25,000 Japanese were marrying foreigners every year, with Japanese men outnumbering women 3 to 1 (Barr, 1996: 8).

Since the "foreign-marriage boom" of the late 1980s, women’s shelters throughout Japan are having their resources strained by an increasing number of "foreign" wives seeking to escape abusive husbands. Their plight is exacerbated by the fact that very few foreign residents are ever granted citizenship, including ones married to Japanese. Consequently, for foreign wives, no matter how long they may have called Japan "home," divorce means the loss of a sponsor so that visas are not extended or renewed. Even if the offspring of such marriages are citizens, the mothers almost never are. Thus, they have little access to governmental benefits. Women in this situation find themselves confronting not only a broken marriage but the state as well. Misao Hanazaki, founder of the Friendship Asia House Cosmos, a "safe house" for women in the suburbs of Tokyo, claims that many of the foreign wives suffer from racial and ethnic bigotry even from their husbands. According to Hanazaki, "The most important thing is to remove Japanese people’s prejudice against Asian women" (quoted by Barr, 1996: 8).

Despite this disturbing trend in divorces, "Japanese" society has become more open toward integrating "non-Japanese blood" than it was just fifty years ago. There is a postwar trend of demythologizing blood as the foundation of an innate and immutable identity. Japan is slowly acknowledging that it has always been multicultural.

Interest in Asian countries has also been increasing in the 1990s. Asian films and other arts are enjoying greater global exposure than ever before. Fifty years after World War II, Japanese officials are publicly admitting at least partial responsibility for that conflagration, while new relationships with other Asian countries are being explored. For instance, Ritsumeikan University will open a new branch in Kyushu in 1998. The university announced that it would accept many students from other Asian countries.

In the Kobe earthquake, The Mainichi Shimun reported the heartwarming conduct of Koreans in Japan: a Korean school provided both "Koreans" and "Japanese" with shelter and food (Sorano, 1995: 136). Although there were some rumors that slandered Koreans, they did not spread widely (Sorano, 1995: 136; Ueda, 1995: 119-120). In the Kanto earthquake, which occurred in 1923, there were rumors that Koreans had poisoned wells, looted, started riots, and so on. The result was that Japanese attacked them. It was estimated that 6,400 Koreans were killed (Ueda, 1995: 119). Compared with such a situation, the Kobe earthquake revealed a major shift of attitudes toward Koreans in Japan. Today, most Koreans in Japan are second and third generation Japanese-born Koreans. Most do not speak Korean. They are said to be confused about their identity. Under such circumstances, an increasing number of them have come out to reveal their Korean identity, by publicly using their Korean names. Koreans in Japan usually have both Korean and Japanese names. In the past, most of them used Japanese names in everyday public life in order to avoid discriminatory treatment. Many younger Koreans, however, are now willing to declare their ethnic heritage.

HARMONY AS APPRECIATING DIFFERENCES

Harmony is also a musical concept. Chords are made up of different complementary notes. The whole sound is constituted by simultaneous differences, or, put differently, by systatic relationship. In other words, different modes of relationships constitute the integral world. Difference is recognized and appreciated only through the relationship of one to the other. Each comes into being only through difference, and difference renders uniqueness and meaning. Systatic relationships include both process and effect, and all modes of time and statements co-exist. Put differently, they are integrating in systatic awareness (see Chapter 1). However, systatic awareness does not give us only joy. It gives us pain as well. "Awareing" differences are to understand or appreciate the co-existence of joy and pain, just like the joy and pain that Koreans experience when they "come out," or the joy and pain we (you and I) experience when we are "concretizing" harmony.

NOTES

1. Some scholars disagree that Prince Shotoku’s Seventeen Articles should be translated as a "constitution," because it does not include any penal code (Sidney Brown,

2. We thank Dr. Yuasa, who suggested that we should examine Prince Shotoku's Constitution for the analysis of wa.

3. For instance, the "homeless," in the latter part of the twentieth century in the United States, are practically invisible. When floods ravaged the northwestern part of the country in 1996, the government paid thousands of property owners to rebuild their homes (even in known flood plains). But the homeless who lived along the banks of the rivers were hardly noticed. They received nothing.

4. The term "eta" came to be used toward the end of the Kamakura period (1192–1333) (Aomori, 1994; Suginohara. 1982). It was "an appellation for those people who made a living by slaughtering oxen and horses and skinning them, and therefore lived on river beaches and received discriminative treatment" (Suginohara, 1982: 131).

5. The current number of Ainu is estimated to be 50,000 (Burger, 1995; Kayano, 1994: 29).

6. After the 1970s, new emerging fields of social science (international politics, comparative politics, international studies, etc.) began conducting research on identity, multiethnicity, minorities, and so on, and to explore the way different ethnic groups live together (Yun, 1987: 35).

7. The source for these statistics is the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, which has offered such data every year since 1965.

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