

Chapter 1

*Gaiatsu* and Cultural Judo

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The train came out of the long tunnel into the snow country.

—Yasunari Kawabata

**PRESCRIPT**

Nothing is more dramatic than running out of time and uncertainty. The fear of drama can be finally overcome by embracing the permanence of death bringing to an end the disease of life. However, the attempt to eliminate all risk has its own risks.

**PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE**

Because of Japan's rich literary legacy, its relationship with the West is wonderfully documented from the point of view of the culturally, economically, and (one must not forget) militarily colonized. It is an excellent case study of the confusion and suffering that colonization has on the colonized.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese term *gaiatsu* means "outside pressure." It was most commonly used in the late 1980s to refer to coercion from powers outside of Japan, usually the United States. Such coercion typically referred to colonial practices, such as encouraging Japan to open domestic markets to global competition and to modify regulation on financial institutions so that they would come into line with Western practices. This is what William Greider (1997) derides as so-called harmonization. This process is what others legitimize in pseudo-scientific and

inoculating rhetoric as a natural evolutionary tendency toward equilibrium manifested as wise conformity to a dominating culture.

Currently, there is a tension the world over between various forms of sovereignty (national, regional, and of the self) and global homogenization (Kramer, 1992; 1997; also see Chapter Fourteen in this volume). But *gaiatsu* is neither a new term nor a new process. Nor is it unique to Japan. According to Jared Diamond (1993) and Eric Kramer (1992), the trend toward global homogenization and cultural extinction began in massive earnest with Columbus's voyage to the New World in 1492.

In this chapter, I compare and contrast what Edmund Husserl (1913/1980) calls the natural attitude as it is evinced in Japan and the United States as projected through government and business interests. I also wish to address the quality of the contact between the two cultures, which may be characterized as *gaiatsu*, at least from the Japanese point of view or as inevitable modernization from the Western perspective. I have chosen as data the reflections of Japan's greatest writers, including Soseki, Tanizaki, Futabatei, Kawabata, and others. As makers of culture, they were and are especially cognizant of cultural pressures coming to bear from imported (nonindigenous) value systems, expectations, imaginations, and lifestyles (Smith, 1997).

According to Husserl, a natural attitude is an untested metaphysical thesis that is so completely presupposed that to the person who lives the attitude it remains fundamentally invisible and, as such, practically untestable. In short, it is not yet thematized as a contingency, as being merely hypothetical. The natural attitude is the basic sense of reality (the nature of the world), a prejudice so deeply ingrained that it rarely occurs to one to question its veracity and validity. It is the way things are.

So, then, how do we propose to talk about the hypothetical natural attitude, to liberate ourselves from dogmatic slumbers? The best and perhaps only way is through the difference of antithetical propositions. There are two ways to be exposed to difference, and the first is very easy: Leave one's life-world. When we enter a very foreign milieu, what is real, true, predictable, and innocuous becomes foregrounded for us. The second way is more difficult. To this end one must proceed in a sort of two-step fashion. The first step involves reflexively scrutinizing two or more different systems, for instance the Euro-American and Japanese senses of what is naturally given; uncritically presupposed by each. The second step—which is more basic and leads to the first way of liberation from dogma—is to compare two or more respective beliefs about knowledge, including artistic practice, for in the attempt to render reality capacities, perspectives, illuminations, and limitations are most clearly revealed. Each culture offers a unique solution to living, a style of living that embodies prejudices and presumptions about what is possible and impossible, good and bad, practical and impractical, sacred and profane.

One does not realize that one is Japanese ever so much as when one leaves Japan or finds oneself confronted with the foreign. Just as a sense like touch is

not noticed until it is violated or disappears, so, too, identity is most salient when it is confronted, perhaps threatened, by difference.

But what happens if the foreign becomes ubiquitous in one's home world? What happens when Japanese find themselves, as Kenzaburo Oe put it, "up to our necks in Western culture" (as quoted in Smith, 1997, p. 234)? Can one be so overwhelmed as to lose one's indigenous identity and become the Other (meaning to come to see the world through the eyes of the Other such that one's own body and culture appear foreign, quaint, silly, or obsolete)? One can, but not entirely. This is because identity conversion can never be complete. Thus, a more or less painful (sometimes even uncannily pleasant) dissonance always manifests and this is the presence of the "Other within" (Smith, 1997). Under such conditions, the foreign may become exalted and mystically exotic, while the mundane life-world becomes drab by comparison. This is how marketing works—by hyping the always new and improved that renders the old, old as such, embarrassingly obsolete, and boring. Progress demands dissatisfaction with and the abandonment of tradition. For instance, it is no accident that the great Japanese author Jun'ichiro Tanizaki has been regarded as a tourist in his own country.

In his romantic youth, Tanizaki rejected all things Japanese and became a Jazz Age dandy. He moved to the heart of the *gaijin* community at the Bluff in Yokohama, took Western-style dancing lessons, studied English, and in 1923 proclaimed the devastating earthquake marvelous because it afforded an opportunity to rebuild the capital in the image of great Western cities with: "Orderly thoroughfares, shiny new paved streets, a flood of cars, blocks of flats rising floor on floor, level on level in geometric beauty ... And the excitement at night of a great city, a city with all the amusements of Paris or New York" (quoted in Keene, 1984, pp. 750–751). Like so many other artists and intellectuals, Tanizaki was intoxicated with the initial wave of modernization, imagining a new Japan "where champagne glasses floated like jellyfish among the evening dresses, tailcoats, and tuxedos" (quoted in Keene, 1984, p. 750). But a strong hangover followed the libation of Western spirits. Tanizaki discovered that he could not and probably did not really want to become Western. More sober, he moved to the ancient capital, Kyoto, and penned his self-satire *A Fool's Love* (which was serialized in the mid-1920s and was also translated as *Naomi*) wherein a young femme fatale, who even looks half-Caucasian and half-Japanese, is totally immersed in Western culture and never escapes the chronic inferiority complex of those who accept the mantle of being an "under- and undeveloped" person/society—the buffoonery of imitation.

The appeal of being half-and-half marks the impact of cultural hegemony on developing countries. But the half-and-half look holds much less allure, let alone being elevated to a beauty ideal, in the pure centers of power. Although Japan has been widely criticized for being a homogenous, racist society (during the 1960s and 1970s especially), admiration for the half-Caucasian phenotype has been a beauty icon in Japan, at least since World War II. This is demonstrated by

the use of mixed-race models by cosmetics giants, such as Shiseido (see Chapter Three). But this esteem for mixed-race beauty was not shared in the origins of colonial power where the All-American cover girls (Jennifer O'Neill, Candice Bergen, Lauren Hutton, Margaux Hemingway), and the mod British look (Twiggy, Jean Shrimpton, and Veruschka) reigned supreme, with Twiggy being the first mass-merchandised model in history. Tanizaki's character, who looks half-and-half, is not a fusion of cultures but a metaphor for the stress between modernization and tradition.

Tanizaki tore himself away from the hypnotizing vision of modernity and the fawning posture of what Nietzsche called the frog's perspective on the world he had assumed, meaning always looking up in adoration. Following his move to Kyoto, in 1928–29 Tanizaki published the autobiographical novel *Some Prefer Nettles* (1995 English), in which the main character (reminiscent of the real-life first minister of education in Japan, Arinori Mori, whose confusion can now be seen as a synecdoche to the entire post-Meiji era) is faced with a profound choice between East and West, tradition and the abandonment thereof. Like Mori, the main character in *Some Prefer Nettles* finally chooses the traditional Japanese way, divorcing his stylishly modern wife and coming to settle with "traditional ease" in an old Kyoto house.

### THE PARADOXES OF ASSIMILATION

The expressions of artists reveal their states of mind. They are the canaries in the coal mines of cultural change. Many Japanese artists even today, like Yoshiro Kato, raise the issue of what W. E. B. Du Bois in another context called the malady of double consciousness (Du Bois, 1903/1995). Double consciousness involves the internalization of the Other's point of view, which, according to assimilationists, is exactly what the model minority is supposed to do. But original assimilationists like Herbert Spencer did not presume that such self-disintegration would make a person happy, just more functionally fit within the dominant economy.

Some, like William Gudykunst and Yun Young Kim (1997) equate adaptive conformity with survival so that nonconformists are presumably doomed, their existence anathema to life (especially of the system to which functionalists always give priority) (p. 352). One of their paradoxes is this: These writers argue a progressive ideology but also argue that only adaptation to an already existent system can lead to survival. How, then, does system ever change? This presumption is clearly not supported by observations of natural systems. Their problem seems to derive from a Cartesian bias whereby they see the components of the system as somehow different from the system. It is an antiquated metaphysic similar to form and content distinction, a problem rendered irrelevant in biology and other fields that have solved the part-to-whole problem through the concept of symbiosis.

Immigrants are colonizers who survive in part by changing the system into which they move. The idea that a person must "unlearn" or "deculturize" themselves flies in the face of massive evidence of diaspora experienced all over the highly mobile modern world. People do not unlearn or forget even as they succeed in an adopted home, for when they return to their original home their (sometimes painful) nostalgia is rooted in memories of things as they once were but no longer are.

Furthermore, Gudykunst and Kim (1997) naively assume that simply because one internalizes the values of the dominant group and mimics their behavior patterns, even self-consciously agreeing with the dominant values, such a person will integrate into the holistic system, will become a member of the in-group. Belonging, however, is not solely an individual psychological process or simple aping. Instead it is a sociological process. It is a symbiotic relationship between a person and others, including the environment as a whole. It is not within the sole control of the individual to say whether he or she has been accepted. Rather, it is up to the group to make that happen. An outsider can actually be rejected as a weirdo for acting and talking too much like the locals. Hence the designation *henna gaijin*, applied to strange strangers who do not seem to realize that they are not and cannot become Japanese. This sort of boundary maintenance is not unique to Japan (Kramer, 1997, 2000b).

### Confusing Directions: Conforming Means Not to Conform

The logic of those who suggest aping behavior leads to a quagmire. The most harmonious path to take under such conditions is to accept the role the dominant group expects one to play. But if that role includes the expectation that the newcomer *will* not and *should* not act like locals, then conforming to group expectations means to *not* act like locals. If the dominant culture presumes that one can never become an in-group member, then conformity means not becoming an in-group member. Under such conditions, the more one conforms to the host society's expectations of sojourners, the more unlikely it is that the sojourner can ever belong. Their foreignness can never be forgotten. Thus, conforming to the mainstream's expectations prevents one from gaining inclusion. If group expectations present a status for the sojourner that is dehumanizing, then either resistance is inevitable or self-esteem is utterly destroyed.

To the extent that a minority person successfully internalizes the worldview (culture, including values, motives, and expectations) of the dominant group, that person comes to see him- or herself through the dominant group's eyes. It is a sort of split personality that can lead one, in extreme cases, to hate oneself and one's own traditional values, expectations, and ancestral ways and to fall under the seduction of foreign images and promises. In the case of powerful colonization, such a person can even come to see herself as foreign within her own land, which is the very definition of diaspora. There are many who, if they

wake up (as Nietzsche would put it), may come to realize that they are suffering from diaspora because they have rejected their home culture (or it has rejected them) as inadequate to the point where they can never go home, and yet they are deluded into thinking that the locals where they live accept them as "one of us" simply on the basis of economic functionality. International immigrants often survive on the sense of the exotic in their adopted home. At the same time they fail to stay in touch with their old home, which they have either rejected or which is changing in their absence. They have failed to adapt to anywhere.

Some writers strain to rationalize such a plight by claiming that this is good, that such a state manifests "evolution" to "intercultural personhood," which is also called being a "universal person" with a "transcultural identity" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 364). Such a meta-identity is defined as "mature," as manifesting the successful escape from the demonic "hidden forces" of culture, leaving behind the "parochialism of culture" altogether (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, pp. 355–369; Kim, 2000). Following Adler (1987), Gudykunst and Kim refer to the experience of stress consequent of encountering cultural difference as a "disease," to be cured by adaptive development (the elimination of difference through assimilation). Such a decultured universal person will not only escape being maladjusted but "rise above the hidden forces of culture" and "overcome cultural parochialism" by "approaching the limit of many cultures and ultimately of humanity itself" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 366).

### Confused Advice

Their confusion is self-evident. On one hand, Gudykunst and Kim claim that becoming one with a culture is the goal of adaptation, thus rendering "well adjusted," "balanced" people, while on the other hand they claim that the ultimate goal is to become an absurdity—a totally deculturized human being (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997). These are two completely irreconcilable goals. On one hand, the advice is to sink as deep into a culture as possible and conform behaviorally, cognitively, and affectively; on the other hand, the advice is to abandon the notion of culture altogether in the attempt to achieve "meta-identity." If we take the latter claim seriously, that escaping culture is the goal of evolution, then what they are promoting is a transcendental global identity beyond viewpoints, which (according to all serious literatures on learning) would mean the elimination of mind and knowledge because all knowing involves a perspective (Nietzsche, 1882/1974; Gadamer, 1960/1993). This is what they are promoting.

Ultimately, Gudykunst and Kim (1997) advocate a dream of escaping the disease of culture (p. 360), with all of its "emotional defilements" by way of "psychic evolution" (p. 365) to achieve total "deculturation" (which means erasing or "unlearning" one's self-identity; p. 360). Gudykunst and Kim claim that only insofar as one unlearns one's self can one achieve the salvation of becom-

ing "transcultural." This is a very old mysticism dressed up in pseudo-scientific terminology. It is a rehash of the ancient mystical dream of escaping the contingent world of subjects, the wheel of life, and achieving eternal and total equilibrium (death), becoming disembodied by "rising above" the contingencies of locale to a "higher level of cognitive complexity" (p. 364), which presumably correlates with greater communication competence. Gudykunst and Kim (1997) note that an individual who has evolved to the "mature," "adjusted," and "balanced" status of "intercultural personhood" is a person characterized by being able to communicate effectively and who manifests "individual traits within the communicator" such as unusual stability, a strong central organization based on cultural universals and "marked telepathic sensitivity" (p. 254). This, of course, begs several questions, including who picks the values, motives, and expectations that are to be elevated to absolute "universal" status.

The dream of escaping the here and now and rising through stages of evolution to a sort of astral realm of pure "good," "truth," and "beauty" (p. 366) that transcends the parochialism of any and all earthly cultures is an expression of neo-Hegelian idealism mixed with Spencerian social Darwinism (Kramer, 2000b). If the solution to problems in intercultural interaction is to simply eliminate cultural differences by eliminating culture as a salient dimension of life, then the solution to inefficient communication is to simply stop trying and instead transcend all differences that form the content of messages. Insofar as this disembodied meta-identity is evident among cosmopolitans today, they resemble what Pico Iyer (2000) calls homeless "global souls." They have no sense of place, no allegiance or loyalty, no obligations that come with group membership, and no identity. They are the fruition of extreme wealth and egocentrism: monads, but not exactly, for they are parasitic on the communities they live within but do not reciprocate. They are hermetic expressions of postmodern independence. They are infinitely narrow, obsessed with what Foucault (1981/1988) called the care and feeding of the self. But this is a care unlike that found in ancient Greece. Rather it is what Foucault calls "the California cult of self," by which hypertrophic egocentrism is manifested as an avoidance of all group obligations and emotional commitment (or the sin of "attachment," as Gudykunst and Kim call it).<sup>2</sup> Such self-segregation is achieved by a monkish lifestyle, which renders individuals out of touch with that which they claim to understand and explain. It is like claiming to be a child psychologist who has never had extended exposure to children.

What emerges is the opposite of what is promised about becoming a global citizen who communicates effectively with all whom he or she encounters. The current strain of assimilationism advises the impossible—that one lose one's mind, which is precisely Gudykunst and Kim's advice. This is ironic because their advice is simply a replay of Arthur Schopenhauer's position, a position that Nietzsche chided him for more than a century ago: the desire to make a "Buddhism for Europeans," thus promoting having no mind. What emerges from such advice is an intensely narrow, self-reinforcing worldview. So long as

the global soul has adequate means to make life convenient and so long as he or she does not have any "defiling attachments" and obligations like children (or even a spouse, thus the monkish lifestyle), then the global soul can exist as such. But obligations, which the vast majority of human beings in the actual world experience, force adults to get involved in their local culture and community. Being obligated is identical, for example, with parenting, with socializing children. This is why it takes several years to raise human offspring.

The hypothetical transcultural or meta-identified global souls can survive on the surface of the life-world at a conceptual level because they have no adult responsibilities. They simply take for granted all those who raised them and make life around them convenient without reciprocity to the community. Without deep, compelling attachments, which preempt their obsession with total personal control, they are little more than tourists. They can dedicate all their efforts to themselves alone. The dream of total adaptation means not adapting to any culture but abandoning all cultural dimensions of life; at a minimum, it is bizarre advice. The meta-identity is utterly abstract. It is reductionism to functionality, but this is not the same as integration as an in-group member, for the in-group also includes the dysfunctional and those not seen as a function at all.

The motive to reduce life to a fetish and thereby avoid all emotional attachments results in the robot, which has no care for others or community-place (something other than physical convenience and beauty). It is identical with its function, defined by work implementation. This makes sense, because the model minority, the most malleable of individuals, is presumed to present no alter ego, no emotional needs, no disagreements—only silent, efficient, uncontentious labor. But for the assimilationists themselves, they do not conform but demand that their needs and way of doing things be the center toward which model minorities gravitate. *Effective communication* and *functional fit* mean that all accommodation and change are supposed to come from the model minority. Actual people live far more complex lives. They have multiple responsibilities and obligations, not just those associated with their personal careers. The assimilationists' ideal, their plan for escaping the pain of being alive, has never existed because forced (and sometimes even voluntary) assimilation involves its own problems. Without a cultured self, there could be no communication and also no perspective and therefore no knowledge base that would enable functional fit.

*Double consciousness* is a much more accurate description of the case than self-contradicting notions of adaptation leading to disembodied being in the pathetic attempt to escape all striving, attachment, caring, community, and life (Kramer, 2000a; Nietzsche, 1886/1972). The promise of escapist liberation is nothing more than a rehash of the contempt the great religions hold for the subject, the body, this world of contingencies, diversities, and culture. Culture falls opposite nature. To the positivist, culture is the realm of subjective nonsense while nature harbors objective universal truths; thus the desire to es-

cape culture as a solution to intercultural communication. It is as Nietzsche (1886/1972) noted a "total collapse of the will," which seeks only to escape the "wheel of life" once and for all behind the cloister's walls, the *caput mortuum* of existence, the celebration of death made possible by a "positive" weariness of living—the total failure to adapt.

## SCIENCE FICTION AND DARWIN

It is important to recall just what *adaptation* means. It is not the same thing as learning through self-conscious self-modification in the service of a perceived future need, a mistaken version of evolution as learning presumed by some cognitivists and the theory of intercultural adaptation (Kramer, 2000a). Unless one believes in creationism or some other form of intelligent design hypothesis, evolution is random. Learning, however, is very often willfully directed and goal oriented. I want to learn how to fix my car, and so I set out to take a class in automotive repair. But evolution, so far as we know, has no final goal. For instance, if an insecticide is dumped on a swamp it may kill 99.9 percent of the mosquitoes there. One-tenth of 1 percent of the mosquitoes live, however, not because they change or adjust to the insecticide but because they were already resistant to it before ever encountering it. The accidentally resistant mosquitoes endure to reproduce and repopulate the swamp with resistant offspring. They do not mimic the majority population, nor do they consciously modify themselves to survive. Such an ability would require foresight, and it would also require operating on oneself to modify one's own genetic code, which is learning and proactive engineering to outrun the calamity. So far as we know, only humans can do this, and only humans go beyond adapting to the environment as given to proactively adapting it to their desires. Evolution and adaptation are reactionary postures with the exception of mutation, which is strictly blind trial and error. As for mutation, it, too, is a matter of pure accident, unless of course one believes in supernatural guidance, Hegel's invisible hand of the Absolute Logic of the system. Mutation involves random changes in genetic makeup, a small number of which prove actually survivable, not as coherent and consistent articulations of virtual logic but by means of implementing dependent testing.

Charles Darwin never postulated that evolution was going anywhere (he was not a positivistic mystic who believed in eschatological master plans), nor did he claim that evolution involved post facto adjusting to anything. There is no divine watchmaker with a preestablished flowchart of evolutionary niches. This misconception is what Kramer (2000b) calls *nichism*, and it involves politicizing Darwin's ideas, distorting them into a semi-mystical ideology of legitimizing for forced compliance gaining and social conformity—a revival of nineteenth-century Spencerianism. It is a political rhetoric that attempts to naturalize and universalize a contingent political agenda.

## COMMUNICATION AND RELATIVE IDENTITY

Under the condition of double consciousness, one can even come to hate one's own phenotype, as evinced by Tanizaki in his novel *In Praise of Shadows* where he describes how "the skin of Westerners, even those of a darker complexion, [has] a limpid glow. Thus it is that when one of us goes among a group of Westerners it is like a grimy stain on a sheet of white paper" (Tanizaki, 1933-34/1988, p. 31). When it is realized that becoming identical to the Other (adapting as Gudykunst and Kim use the word) is impossible, backlash often occurs. Here is where the real threat of violence and mental instability arise.

Identity is dependent on difference, which comes from context. Without difference, there is no identity. Both fold into one. As long as difference persists, then the nature of the difference affects the sense of identity.

Thus, Japan seems advanced and sophisticated when compared with underdeveloped societies. But when compared to a society perceived to be superior—as Western Europe and the United States were thought to be by many Japanese after the Meiji Restoration—then the sense of self-identity may not be so positive. Identity, as hermeneutics demonstrates, is an always shifting relational phenomenon realized through language and action, through what Mikhail Bakhtin (1975/1981) calls dialogue, and J. L. Austin (1961/1975) calls elocutionary force (see also Moore, 1959 and Wittgenstein, 1953/2002). As R. Buckminster Fuller (1970) put it, "I seem to be a verb" (also his book title).

For Bakhtin, dialogism is the epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Like Husserl, Bakhtin insists that everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole and that there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning other meanings. Not unlike Heidegger's (1927/1962) notion of the linguisticity of *Dasein* and Ferdinand de Saussure's (1916/1959) concept of language system, Bakhtin also argues that human being-in-the-world is essentially structured dialogically largely because meaning is mandated by the preexistence of the language-world relative to any of its current inhabitants. We are born into a linguistic community, and by communication (verbal and nonverbal), community and membership identity exists. Heteroglossia, or how one meaning will affect another, is determined only at the moment of contact.<sup>3</sup>

For Bakhtin, "A word, discourse, language or culture undergoes 'dialogization' when it becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same things" (1975/1981, p. 427). Thus, undialogized reality is authoritatively blind, absolutely prejudiced. Comparison enables us to know the Other and also ourselves.<sup>4</sup> But how the comparison proceeds is always already perspectival. As a youth, Tanizaki saw the world differently than he did as a more mature person.

Once we are dialogized, put into discourse with an Other and so made relative, then who and what we are becomes both revealed and concealed. The concealment leads to the mode of being we shall call the search. It is an irony that

at the moment of contact with an Other, which enables us to speak of "I," at that same instant the sense of "I" becomes as much problematic as clarified for it calls into question our response. Because the Cartesian duality has come to be seen as an obsolete metaphysic, the boundary between my private essence and my public deeds is erased. I am what I do and what I do with what is done to me. Action and reaction become indeterminate. How I talk about the world may very well reveal more about me than the world I purport to describe. How I see the world is as much a reflection of my perspective as what it is I am looking at. Indeed, the difference between the two in principle cannot be distinguished.

One can claim that my point of view yields a distorted version of reality only if one has what Nietzsche (1886/1972) calls a disembodied and disinterested immaculate perception of the *ding an sich* (the thing in itself). Other than the purported existence of omniscient divinity, so far as is known, only humans have knowledge of the world; insofar as it is knowable the world is knowable only as a perspective. Salience is integral to perception. Even a computer, insofar as it "thinks," already interprets (has a limited perspective), for thinking is a habit of grammar and experience, an activity, and every activity pertains to the one who acts (see Nietzsche, 1886/1972, part One, section seventeen). Perspectives are knowable as such only through communication with other perspectives. In the absence of any divine meta-criteria, no one perspective can be privileged absolutely. Thus, the world is dialogized, relativized, bringing about both the possibility and the crisis of identity.

## DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS JAPANESE-STYLE: SELF-HATRED AND "ADAPTATION"

The sense of self that emerges through contact is largely dependent on the nature of the relationship with the Other. Joseph Campbell (1988) has noted the universalism of ethnocentrism. It is common for various indigenous groups to have a word in their language with which they denote themselves, and the word typically translates between languages as simply "the people." All other humans are typically accorded a status that is more like that of a subhuman species or as distorted humans.

This basic prejudice about the species-self is just as evident among European groups as it is elsewhere. In fact, it is arguable that such self-arrogance is most powerful among Europeans, but this would be incorrect. No such comparative measure is possible. All people tend to be very proud and prejudiced, and even though Western economic, military, and technological supremacy may seem self-evident in comparison to most other groups, this does not mean that they see the West as superior, for many judge on criteria other than material prowess, such as moral qualities. Nevertheless, the spread of Western European civilization has been most successful in terms of cultural imperialism. Thus, it

should not be surprising that when Herbert Spencer taught Arinori Mori billiards at the Athenaeum Club in London, he also convinced Mori that according to his neo-Hegelian/Darwinian beliefs, the white European (especially the Englishman) was the most successful and therefore superior human among lesser "humans."

Mori was eager to improve Japan's lot in the great and positive evolutionary hierarchy. It is little wonder that Japan rushed to copy Western-style colonialism, with dire consequences for its Asian neighbors. Mori, like most modern-thinking Japanese at the time, embraced Westernization with gusto. On his return to Washington, D.C., from Japan some years later, Mori (along with Yukichi Fukuzawa) even went so far as to organize the famed Meiji Six Society, which loosely echoed the purpose of the Athenaeum Club. Like Spencer, Mori paradoxically came to equate civilization with the so-called natural forces espoused by social Darwinism. Following Spencer's logic, Mori advised young Japanese men studying in the United States to take American wives, which he himself did, to improve the gene pool of Japan, and also to abandon *nihongo* (our meager language) in favor of English.

Then, as is well known, the other side of Mori's double consciousness emerged with vehement reaction, a process that has been played out again and again by Japanese artists and intellectuals, and perhaps still is by the typical Japanese cosmopolitan today. He divorced and remarried in Japanese style and propagated a fervent form of nationalism, promoting the teaching of *kokutai* (the national essence) in the schools. Ironically, he would be assassinated by an ultra-nationalist, a fallen samurai like himself, for allegedly not following proper protocol during a visit to a sacred shrine at Ise and for generally betraying *kokutai*, including abandoning the teaching of Confucian ethics in the schools and Shinto as the official religion.

Although we may see this as a bygone problem, today writers like Gudykunst and Kim offer academic justification for willful "self-disintegration" and "deculturation" as a pragmatic solution to inefficient difference (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, pp. 360–62). The inefficiency comes in the form of "disequilibrium" with the global system. In fact, they claim that the disintegration of the self will go far beyond improved communication between groups to nothing short of "psychic evolution" in an "upward-forward [dialectical] progression accomplishing an increased level of functional fitness (greater adaptation) and psychological health" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 363). Development is teleologically and positivistically evolutionary. Conformity is the path to evolutionary progress, happiness, and sanity. Of course, positivistic thinking—a culture-specific ideology—proclaims itself to be the very tip of human evolution. This is typical ethnocentrism.

Here we have something also very different from the Nietzschean *übermensch*, for according to assimilationism, the new adaptive trans-human is not (and in fact by definition cannot be) a disequilibratingly creative force making a future of "infinite experiments." Of course this is self-contradicting, for how

can the trans-human be different if it is not to be disequilibrating in any way? We are left to believe that some sort of inert ultimate peace of mind and behavior will prevail. The new superadaptive meta-identity will be either an inert posthuman, beyond good and evil and the ability to communicate because parochial cultures and languages will have been left behind in the dustbin of failed human communities, or a dedicated conformist much more akin to the utopians offered by left and right Hegelians and their respective totalitarian regimes. In the latter case, the ideal model minority is to be as Mori was in his reactionary backlash, an ardent nationalist. Reeducation, reenculturation (for Mori, textbook censorship) via psychosocialization, is the ticket to adjustment and peace of mind. Feedback control works to maintain system equilibrium both in an individual's mind through self-monitoring and in society as a whole through what Irving Janis (1982) calls mind guards, which are very close to model minorities, for they have little power and yet tend to be the most fervent defenders of the faith, self-selecting snitches who adore authority, along with professional thought police. With their help everything is more predictable, redundant, and stable. But, as is well understood by experts in information systems, redundancy is uninformative and maddeningly boring (Kramer, 2000a, 2000b), and ultimately not very profitable either (as noted by Joseph Schumpeter's 1942/1984 concept of creative destruction). Being creative and original by definition means being unconventional and breaking rules, what Nietzsche called transvaluating values, which is revolutionary, not conformist. Beyond this the consistent and constant reinforcement of established rules—be it by social or artistic convention or by the KGB—squashes dissent as well as creativity. Such surveillance and centralized command and control can lead to the ultimate repression; the logical systematics of group-think (Janis, 1982; Koestler, 1960, 1967/1969; 1964/1990; 1946/1984; Lewin, 1948; Solzhenitsyn, 1973/1997). In 1960, after making a tour of Japan and other Eastern nations, in *The Lotus and the Robot*, Arthur Koestler, reluctantly came to the conclusion that the East cannot help the West escape its closing cage of strict ordination.

### THIRD CULTURE AND THE NIHON-GA SCHOOL

A more modest claim offered by the modern social Darwinists/Spencerians is that as one becomes increasingly intercultural in one's "internal system" a person will create a "third culture perspective" (Gudykunst, Wiseman, & Hammer, 1977). But just as the theory of "cultural adaptation" is hardly original with Kim (1988), so, too, this notion of dialectical synthesis between two cultures was already proposed by Ernest Fenollosa, an American philosopher who taught in Japan beginning in 1878. Fenollosa promoted the new *nihon-ga* school of art, which attempted to combine media and themes from both Japanese and Western forms. But as Smith (1997) has noted, the "shriveled fruit of Fenollosa's synthesis" led nowhere because it offered no real innovation and

also because it ran afoul of the officially sanctioned aesthetic enforced by nationalist reactionaries bent on supposedly preserving the system. Fenollosa defied assimilation.

According to social Darwinism, the solution to the Meiji ambivalence is to either blend back into the prison-house of traditional form, or conform to the Western-conceived world order of imported culture, thus ceasing to be Japanese. But the traditionally more collectivistic world confronts at least two paradoxes. Achieving *shutai-sei* (autonomous selfhood) demands that one not follow any tradition, including the one that promotes it! Furthermore, as Du Bois understood, how can one possibly conform to a dominating culture that defines you as never being worthy of inclusion? The more you become the Other and see yourself through the eyes of the Other, the more you must admit that the effort is hopeless. Mori's suggestion that Japanese intermarry to gain acceptance in the modern world promotes a quagmire. To be valuable is to be erased. This is senseless and, as Du Bois and countless others understand, hardly a path to happiness.

### THE VALUE-LADEN GOAL OF POSITIVE SCIENCE

What is behind all these suggestions for engineering harmony, happiness, and proper fit? The goal of such positive science is to promote the universal good, and happiness. But Nietzsche notes that "Herbert Spencer espoused that the concept 'good' is essentially identical with the concept 'useful,' 'practical,' so that in the judgments 'good' and 'bad' mankind has summed up and sanctioned . . . the 'valuable in itself'" (1887/1967, first essay, section three). Like all human experience, the useful and practical embodies a point of view of contingent interests. Difference is not a problem until moral judgment is imposed, which is to say, the good. At this moment the mere recognition of difference switches to judgmental ethnocentric prejudice. In this case, the good is defined by bourgeois positivism, as ever more predictable (stable) and expanding markets in the interest of uninterrupted capital expansion according to Western-style *laissez-faire* ideology.

Although fairly transparent (at least to innumerable observers of the emergent ideology of globalism), we must slow down to appreciate the morality of these social engineers who would help us escape what, to a Nietzschean, is best in life: the motor of change, the tragic worldview. For it is the optimism of science and its claim to universal validity that made a panacea of knowledge. What is the goal of science? In section twelve of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche (1882/1974) answers:

The ultimate goal of science is to create for man the greatest possible amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain? But suppose pleasure and pain were so linked together that he who *wants* to have the greatest possible amount of the one must have the greatest possible amount of the other also . . . ? And perhaps that is how things are! The Stoics, at any rate, thought so, and were consistent when they desired to have the least

possible amount of pleasure in order to have the least possible amount of pain from life. . . . Today, too, you have the choice: either *as little pain as possible*, in short painlessness . . . or *as much pain as possible* as the price of an abundance of subtle joys and pleasures hitherto rarely tasted!

Nietzsche points out that with the hypervaluation of a positive attitude comes the end of Attic tragedy and lyric poetry, the spirit of spontaneity and music. Yet out of the vitality of the Attic dithyramb, science was born (Nietzsche, 1872/1967, section seventeen)! But once born, the scientific perspective becomes institutionalized as an "ism." The enthusiasm of true spontaneous music gives way to recitation and replication (the timid copying of success), to rote memory and blind devotion for which we stupidly admire computers and even seek to call ourselves cognitive machines.

With the death of tragedy comes the new virtue of *stilo rappresentivo* (representational style; Nietzsche, 1872/1967, section nineteen). And what is science? It is the Apollonian defeat of suffering. "Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification of the eternity of the phenomenon: here beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life: pain is obliterated by lies from the features of nature" (Nietzsche, 1872/1967, section sixteen). Thus we have the emerging opposition between status quo and its champion, transcendental certitude, on one hand (Plato), and ecstatic art, which can flourish only in the flux of "experimental life," on the other hand (Heraclitus) (Kramer, 1997).

Out of the vital power of Attic mysteries was born a spoiled child that turned against the forces of creative vitality and toward absolute predictability. One can only wonder what (if any) grandchild science will bequeath to its energetic Dark Age parents. Perhaps it is sterile. Otherwise, any accidental pregnancy and surprise culture of the future would be greeted as a wildfire terrorist, an invalid mistake disruptive of the zero-degree equilibrium.

As Nietzsche pointed out in 1887, those who flee from life and action instead place

"adaptation" in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itself has been defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditions (Herbert Spencer). Thus the essence of life, its *will to power*, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions, although "adaptation" follows only after this; the dominant role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself in which the will to life appears active and form-giving is denied. One should recall what Huxley reproached Spencer with—his "administrative nihilism": but it is a question of rather *more* than mere "administration." (Nietzsche, 1887/1967, second essay, section twelve)

According to the neo-Hegelian Spencerians Gudykunst and Kim (1997), what is ultimately required of strangers (if they want to be happy) in the host global society is to attain functional fit according to its criteria. Friction causes heat.

Heat disrupts equilibrium and therefore it is bad. The chill of rigor mortis is the goal. Although some assimilationists quote Marshall McLuhan, they don't seem to really understand him yet. Nichism is classic modernism that can be stated with a turn of one of McLuhan's (1967, p. 53) phrases, "a piazza [place] for everything [everyone] and everything [everyone] in its [her] piazza [place]." Perfection is a cubical for all. No one is more predictable than a dead man, and row upon row, nothing is more peaceful and orderly than a well-kept modern cemetery.

As Westernization spreads and the entire globe is culturally homogenized, indigenous cultures are suddenly reduced to being squatters in their own lands, of being parasites to the global host culture. According to Gudykunst and Kim (1997), *functional fit* means "the operational (or behavioral) capacity that enables a person to carry out behaviors externally in accordance with the host cultural patterns" (p. 342). This "operational (or behavioral) capacity which enables" a person to mimic normative "external" behavior patterns is, according to Gudykunst and Kim (1997), a mindset that is malleable, passive, flexible, mature, and advanced. This comes down to being user-friendly, easily reprogrammable, to being able and willing to "deculturize," "disintegrate," and "unlearn" one's "cognitive, affective, and operational" self (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, pp. 335–53). For the individual, not the monolithic system, is expected to do all the accommodating. In modern dialectical parlance, people are defined as either assets or liabilities. This is Mori's initial dream come true. But there is the opposite dream.

## EAST MEETS WEST

Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has been pressured to open itself to even more outside pressure under the aegis of being cosmopolitan, sophisticated, and mature. This has called into question the very sense of what is natural and what is cultural for Japanese. Even the sense of the purpose of art has been disrupted by the Western presumption that the endeavor of art is to see oneself by challenging mundane perception, by perpetually abandoning tradition and convention.

For instance, in 1876, the Tokyo government recruited the Italian Babizon-style artist Antonio Fontanesi to come instruct Japan's first oil painters. As recounted by one of his students and an important Meiji-era artist, Chu Asai, one day Fontanesi told his students to go out into the city and sketch. The next day they all returned with blank sketchbooks claiming to have found nothing appropriate to draw—no temples, scholar's retreats, blossoming trees, or dancing cranes. Fontanesi realized that despite the city's endless vistas and scapes, they were unable to see them because they could not (via coconstitutive genesis) see themselves and comprehend where they stand (Kramer, 1993). Again, McLuhan (1967), as he proclaims the desire to suspend judgment as a Renais-

sance legacy, relativizes the modern truth of "the Detached Observer" and its premier value of "No Involvement!" (McLuhan, 1967, p. 53). To many Orientals, this is a curious if not suspect value, one that requires significant concessions (psychological, moral, and political) to accept, for it turns them into subhuman primates or primitivists. The great artistic traditions of the Orient were suddenly made childish, even wrong, certainly backward.

Like their contemporaries who were studying Western techniques in architecture, hygiene, education, industrial manufacture, and even government, the art students were mimicking technical aspects of form under the Meiji precept *wakon yosai* ("Japanese spirit, Western things"). But the new concept of art demanded that the artist discover something not already sedimented in the tradition, in the Japanese spirit. Thus, the critic Kojin Karatani (1993) argues two things. First, although the popular *ukiyo-e* of Utamaro, Hiroshige, and Hokusai depicted everyday life, they were part of the "little tradition," not the grand tradition. Second, Karatani argues that the *Tales of Genji*, the *Genji Monogatari*, like all *monogatari* (the telling of things) manifests a cast of many two-dimensional characters conventionally recycled (a style of writing that even Tanizaki follows as he creates new versions of old tales) rather than an in-depth plot. According to Karatani, "*Monogatari* is pattern, nothing more, nothing less," a "repetitive ritual" (Karatani, 1993, p. 164).

Many, like Karatani (1993) and Smith (1997), argue that the cultural inertia to repeat convention, "reflected no point of view, no transforming individual experience. In painterly terms, missing from the tradition was perspective" like premodern art elsewhere (Smith, 1997, p. 237). The paintings and novels of pre-Meiji did not explicitly say, "I am standing here, and this is what I see" (Smith, 1997, p. 237). However, this assessment is both true and false. The natural attitude (a sort of primordial prejudice) that constitutes identity and perspective and is expressed in the works of the early Meiji artists was what Gebser (1949/1985) calls a "two-dimensional mythic consciousness structure." But this *identification* becomes increasingly revealed as such, as artist after artist confronted the pressure to Westernize. Adaptation engineers' valorization of the mental and moral qualities of the intercultural human, barring any other trans-human criteria, is senseless because it also presumes, in positivistic fashion, that one attitude is more advanced or better than another. In fact, artists like Pablo Picasso and Tara Okamoto were inspired by the prehistoric.

This confrontation with Western techniques and values, which has pushed the Japanese spirit into relief, has had political as well as psychosocial and aesthetic consequences. *Nihon-ga* was a term coined only after the arrival of Western influences. The cultural fusion that marked the new *nihon-ga* style that combined traditional Japanese style with Western techniques presupposed forms and techniques that were distinctly Japanese as such. Only that which has been concealed, the natural attitude of Japan, can be revealed. This process, and not merely the school of thought developed by Fenollosa, is uncontrollable and continues (as we see in the *Sogetsu* school of *ikebana* and the architecture

of the new internationalism). But at the same time, the pressure to Westernize has foregrounded the issue of *kokutai*, the soul of what it is to be Japanese, igniting the debate about who the modern Japanese are and what type of individualism (if any) will flourish. Recalling the coconstitutional process that characterizes the "I" in context, if a new identity emerges, then so does a new world, a new society.

In 1886, the serial novel by Shimei Futabatei, *Drifting Clouds* (1887/1990), appeared, giving its readers a sense of interiority and psychological depth in colloquial language. Hailed as Japan's first modern novel, the isolation of the main character, Bunzo, propels the reader past the dogmatic explication of democratic values into the more intimate question of the individual's place in society. A Japanese critic of the time recognized the paradigmatic shift this novel manifested: "The characters in most novels these days resemble figures in woodblock prints. The characters in *Drifting Clouds*, however, are people in oil paintings" (quoted in Smith, 1997, p. 240). Individualism articulated through naturalism and realism became the metaphysical prejudice of the late Meiji and beyond. But this was a European naturalism, which insisted that a landscape (or psychoscape) be rendered by the artist from within it, that the artist be a personal witness to what he or she represents. And as György Lukács (1958/1963) reminds us, realism is a genre of fiction.

The old Tong Chinese aesthetic criteria adopted by the Japanese, by which an artist could be acclaimed for his skill at painting a flock of geese without having ever seen one, was dismissed. The imperialistic privileging of the European version of perspective would find its resisters, however, as the tragic experience spawned fantastic creativity, just as Nietzsche predicted the unpredictable. Tanizaki (and, we must hasten to add, two born in his literary shadow: Yasunari Kawabata and Kawabata's protégé, Yukio Mishima) has already been acknowledged, but there were also resisting voices that preceded his, such as Mori Ogai and Nagai Kafu, whose characters expressed a revolution toward the new. In Kawabata's masterpiece *Snow Country* (1937/1985), written over a long period of time during the 1930s and 1940s, the protagonist is a modern dance critic who has never seen a ballet and who is utterly detached from his life in Tokyo. But then he takes a trip into the rural snow country and also into the past that still exists, where a geisha shows him the way back to a Japan of intimate peace that he had not known. Smith (1997) tells us that "in these two characters lies the discord between what the Japanese made of themselves and what they had been ... *Snow Country* derives its power from the impenetrable barrier it depicts: the inaccessibility of the past—a past that Kawabata mourned on behalf of many modern Japanese" (p. 161). But it is Soseki Natsume who remains an icon of Meiji and post-Meiji ambivalence toward modernity.

With continued Westernization, it is arguable that the sense of transformative pain, the tragic worldview, has ebbed from Japan's consciousness. Thus, the creative energies that propelled these geniuses have waned, leaving in their wake what has been called Japan Inc.'s trophy art collecting and GNPism.

Japanese art may imitate European trends more now than before when Zola and Flaubert set the standard. Today, the so-called postmodern novel constitutes cutting-edge literature by authors like Haruki Murakami and Banana Yoshimoto, who take pride in having never read the old gatekeepers like Mishima and Oe and who fear being too Japanese. But as name brands and appliances proliferate in their stories as supporting characters, what one sees are shades of Andy Warhol all over again.

## CULTURE AS WOMB: THE LOST REFUGE AND SUICIDE

The gathering storm of global sameness, which many like Nietzsche, Paul Feyerabend (1987), and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1981/1983) have warned us of and which Greider (1997) documents in his book *One World, Ready or Not*, is being sold to all of us by special interests as a positive development. As many have noted, this issue is not a uniquely Japanese problem.<sup>5</sup> Seeking traditional cultural ways as a shelter from the onslaught of global capitalist culture continues in and among many cultures.

We turn again to Japan, for here we see some of the clearest and earliest outlines of a struggle that is increasingly global that is to be confronted with the dualism of finding one's identity in either the past or the future, which are increasingly disconnected (break with the past and leave it behind is the motto of development ideology). As noted concerning the irrelevance of the Cartesian metaphysic, the struggle pertains to everything in the life-world, from the individual's most intimate subjective desires to global financial policy.

One quality of the modern (not postmodern) world is that one can suffer the consequences of diaspora without leaving one's homeland (Kramer, 1997). Before Tanizaki, there was Soseki's ambivalence toward the modern. In Soseki, we find a person so conflicted that he chose to write Western-style fiction in the morning and poetry in the classical Japanese manner in the afternoon. After spending two years studying in England, he disliked it so much that he vowed never to return. But the more famous he became in Japan, the more he hated it, too. He found himself caught in a lonely predicament between tradition and modernity. The dualism in his mind was insurmountable. Thus, his famous dictum that the Japanese could not expect someone else to taste their liquor for them.

Neither the past nor modernity would ultimately be satisfying. Many of Soseki's characters, like Botchan (from the novel *Botchan*, 1906/1992), ape the West, rashly dismissing the old ways while at the same time depending on them. After concluding that the modern world is filled with impostors, Botchan finds solace in the person of an aging maid (his father-in-law's mistress), a literary device used again and again in modern Japanese fiction with woman representing the shelter of the past against the gales of modernity, a telling metaphor as the linear-rational West represents the aggressive masculine—line

against the more content feminine mode of being (Gebser, 1949/1985; Kramer, 1997). The psychic fault line separates sentimental feeling from calculation.<sup>6</sup>

In the book *Kokoro* (1914/1991) Soseki once again explores Japan's confusion between selfishness and individuality, as well as the loneliness of being "swallowed by the whirlpool." Reminiscent of Plutarch's confession at being awestruck by the realization of depth space on the summit of Mt. Ventu in the south of France, the student in *Kokoro* is bedazzled by the sky and open sea, as well as intrigued by the intimate secret of the character K. The experience of sight and sensation becomes for the student the conduit to a new individuated selfhood, an experience so purely personal that only seeing for oneself, without the obligations of relationships on truth, can seem real. But as Sensei warns his student that an indefinite ocean of moral chaos characterizes the world outside the group, he also demonstrates a lack of attachment to the past. Outside the group is the modern, which harbors an amoral anarchy, a boundless sea. There live the twin dragons of relativism and unbearable solitude.

Although Soseki may have transcended the world of opposites, Tanizaki, Kawabata, and Mishima not only reiterated the oil-and-water relationship between modern technocracy and artistic tradition but also chose sides. In Kawabata one finds a sort of resignation or passive acceptance in the face of overwhelming modernization. In this sense he is similar to Thorstein Veblen and Nietzsche in the West.

To Nietzsche's consternation, he reluctantly admits that because of the hegemonic influence of Malthus and Spencer, especially among English psychologists and "for an uncouth industrious race of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, which has nothing but *course* work to get through," this poverty-stricken perspective may have become normative (Nietzsche, 1886/1972, part one, section fourteen). Only a few years later in 1899, Veblen (1899/1994) published his famous *Theory of the Leisure Class*. Like Nietzsche, Veblen reluctantly acknowledges the powerful inertia of modern mass thinking. After critiquing mass culture as barbaric, he put forth his central concept of adaptation, which meant for him the acceptance of adaptation, the adjustment to the new social Darwinism. He fell victim to the rhetoric of bourgeois positivism, with its ethnocentric self-congratulatory posture that argues that it is only natural, only Darwinian to accept Social Darwinism—the tightest hairpin turn of cybernetics. Such a collapse constitutes a pathetic surrender to the sphere of mass consumption. Culture *sui generis* is reduced to resource allocation. In such a world, individuals guard most selfishly the two scalar phenomena that characterize modernity: money and time.

In his novella *House of the Sleeping Beauties*, Kawabata (1933/1969) expresses *bitai*, the contradiction of a deep nostalgia for unfulfilled allure. He attempts to express the feeling of being unable to genuinely repair to a pure past or to embrace modernity. It is a poignant and very insightful articulation of true postmodern diaspora (postmodern in that it does not require physical mobility). In the story an old man frequents a brothel where the prostitutes are,

paradoxically, untouchable virgins. That which makes them so tempting also frustrates, for to touch them ruins them. Thus, Kawabata articulates the frustration of the seductively unattainable, an unadulterated tradition, or a pure modernity (see Mishima's introduction to *House of the Sleeping Beauties*).

Mishima takes a different approach toward the confrontation between creativity and tradition in *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion* (1956/1994). The story was first published as *Kinkakuji* in 1956, a fictionalization of an actual torching of a Kyoto temple by a young monk in 1950. In the novel, Mizoguchi, born physically ugly, poor, and weak, is a hopeless stutterer who is bullied by his classmates. He seeks refuge as an acolyte in a temple in Kyoto. There the young monk becomes obsessed with the temple, at times caught up in his reverence for it, even identifying with the structure. But in the end he destroys the temple wherein he lives because its beauty oppresses him. In real life, Mishima's increasingly schizophrenic despair about the evils of modernity and his inability to truly escape into a characterized past led him to be seen more and more as a farcical buffoon whose public antics embarrassed many who admired his genius.

In the end both Mishima and Kawabata killed themselves, for the temple (Japan, the womb) had been destroyed by others. This is intense diasporic alienation without leaving home, for it had left them. It is no wonder that those who thrive on tradition, artists, would sense this despair more than most. The unfinished and, more important, unfinishable dream of the virgin brothel was "the regret for days lost without ever being had" (Kawabata, 1933/1969, p. 39).

### PECUNIARY TRUTH, THE NEW EQUILIBRIUM?

According to Oe (quoted in Napier, 1993), Mishima's death marks the end of the public clash and churning of tradition and modernization. Now the waters have become placid as the divinity of universal market forces rule with little resistance. Traditional Japan, the beauty does not have the strength to fight the West. With the tragic worldview resolved, the creative energies that flow from such conflict have evaporated (Nietzsche 1872/1967). As Smith (1997) writes, "No one would write like them [Soseki, Tanizaki, Kawabata, and Mishima] again" (p. 248). Such a strong sense of *bitai* requires a feeling of profound loss, a regret expressed in an anthem Mishima wrote in which he says, "We must hide our great sorrow . . . In our land so low fallen" (as quoted in Scott-Stokes, 1974, p. 247).

Perhaps to the ordinary person this is pure bombast. Yet what has globalization brought? A commercial culture wherein Caucasian models are used to promote elite products, even (amazingly) cosmetics for Japanese women, where Western celebrities like Leonardo Di Caprio, Harrison Ford, and Mel Gibson become pitchmen, whereas at home they restrain from such crass commercialization. Anything goes in Japan. The "liberation" of *joshi-puro* (women's pro

wrestling), and hot springs faux "geisha," like the plastic cherry boughs that line city streets, signals what Oe (1993) calls a culturally infantilized Japan; the model minority that is seen but not heard. Japan must struggle to say "no."

During the Japanese Roaring Twenties, even sensuality became ambiguous as geisha became confused with prostitutes in the new capital economy, a trend that became hypertrophic after World War II, with Allied soldiers enjoying the value vacuum that many sojourners presume and exploit in their personal liberation, a sort of ersatz nostalgia for cheap "geisha [sic] girls," an offense returned in kind to the West with the reproduction of European village theme parks throughout the 1980s in Japan. For both sides, a version of the Other became commodified. Once the imitations completely displaced the originals, they became the new authentic culture, a postmodern culture of representation without referent—globalized culture without location. Although the Europeans still had their authentic towns, traditional Japan has slipped away bit by bit.

As if this weren't enough, now many are cheering the shift from the actual to the virtual. The rhetoric of global village has been exposed as the propaganda of the imperial center (Kramer, 2000b). Instead we have the aggregate of the global city with an emphasis on instrumental rather than organic relationships (Kramer, in press). The homogenizing world culture with its particular reality and truth appears to be just as Jules Henry suggested in 1963, a new "pecuniary truth"; truth is what sells.

When Japan came to suffer from double consciousness, it manifested not just in the ambivalence artists felt toward both their home and modernity but also as a national generation gap. Culture came to be equated with *dento* (official tradition), which became institutionalized, embalmed, and interred; in other words, museumized. Culture and tradition became that which was officially selected as worthy of preservation in a glass case and therefore as antiquated and dead (Ikeda & Kramer, 1998). The new Western mode of observation that objectifies culture itself in the peculiar viewing space of the museum had arrived in Japan. Thus, culture, being officially reduced to the antique, is that which the elderly yet value but the young disregard. As such, it came to be displaced in everyday life by the new imported culture of the West like Disney, blue jeans, and James Dean, whereas the new Japanese cultural contribution to the rest of the world became the ability to mass-produce Western inventions cheaply—electronics, cars, and cameras. Industrial products with powerful name recognition came to be the emblems of modern Japanese culture (Miyoshi & Harootunian, 1993). Culture became an industrial by-product, the fruition of Premier Hayato Ikeda's Income Doubling Plan for unfettered economic development. Thus was born the land of the ubiquitous salaryman, a vacant society, "that could neither nourish its artists nor be nourished by them" (Smith, 1997, p. 255).

With the passing of a generation of artists, including Akira Kurosawa, Oe, and Kobo Abe, Japan has few artists of stature. Rather than the coherent mutations that creative genius manifests, aimless "drifting" characterizes contempo-

rary Japanese creative impulses. In Abe's *The Woman in the Dunes* (1962/1991) and also *The Ark Sakura* (1984/1988), human isolation, identity, the flux of continually shifting contexts, and the status of the idea of progress are masterfully illuminated.

Published in 1962 as *Suna no Onna, The Woman in the Dunes* is about an amateur entomologist who wanders into a seaside village, where he is taken prisoner and lowered into a sandpit, and he is forced to live with a young widow there. Typical of the bizarre plots that Japanese existential novels often have, the widow and the wandering teacher are forced to continually shovel the ever-encroaching sand dunes that threaten to bury them and the town. Over the course of the drama, Niki Jumpei, the protagonist, must come to accept his new identity. It may not be incorrect to suggest that the threatening tide of sand represents the onslaught of Western culture and the despised young widow represents tradition's continual struggle to survive. Modern Japanese are ants in the sand of the cosmopolis, the global city that is everywhere and nowhere.

In Abe's *The Box Man* (1973/2001), which is reminiscent of Dostoevsky's *Underground Man*, the entire point of the story is a man's attempt to abandon his original identity and become totally anonymous. In the story he literally decides to lose himself on the dehumanizing streets of Tokyo while wearing a box on his head. This is similar to Ozamo Dazai's *No Longer Human* (1948/1973). Dazai, like Mishima and Kawabata, was a victim of suicide. The actual title of the book literally translates "Disqualified as a Human." Like *The Box Man*, the main character of *No Longer Human* spends the entire story slowly alienating himself from everyone he knows until he is homeless and dies. In the process he attempts unsuccessfully to identify with the women in his life: his sister, his mistress, and his wife.

Differently, but still stressing the marginality of contemporary life, Oe's dedication to his son, Hitari, inspired his search for the ordinary in the margins of life. Such works are unmistakably Japanese, while at the same moment expressing universal human themes. Even the cinema of Torasan approaches this quality of art, though common it may seem by comparison. But the character Torasan (of which a series of nearly thirty movies over three decades was made), though he is always wandering and selling whatever he can to make a living, always has a bed to return to at his sister's house in Tokyo.

In contrast, the so-called postmoderns, as represented by Murakami's *A Wild Sheep Chase* (1982/1989), *Dance, Dance, Dance* (1988/1995), and *The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle* (1994/1997), strive to dislocate any hint of local meaning. In *Dance, Dance, Dance*, the sequel to *A Wild Sheep Chase*, an ordinary divorced man searches for a lover who mysteriously vanished from a dilapidated hotel. He is transformed by a disturbing encounter with another world; in this case a modern hotel in another dimension. Emotionally retarded, the protagonist is an engaged consumer of every current fad from foods to music while describing his journalistic occupation as "shoveling snow," a job nobody likes but somebody has to do. He never signs his stories. He is increasingly harassed by

dreams of his former lover, who disappeared from a shabby old hotel where they had stayed together in Sapporo. An assignment takes him there again only to find the hotel replaced by a new one. When he decides to stay there, he not only finds that something of the old hotel is still supernaturally there but also finds the Sheep Man, a son of the original owner "living in hiding from the system." Each new clue to his lover's whereabouts only leads him deeper into a labyrinth of chaos. He suspects that she has been strangled.

These globalized, decultured, postmodern books exploit a technique of aggregating fragmented episodes of sex and fast food, interjected with brand-name icons, while not even offering a view from the margin via the deconstructive reversal of center with periphery. Not surprisingly, having perhaps achieved transcultural personhood, these new writers dwell on themes of boredom without any "upward-forward" progress. Comparing their lack of attachment and caring to the cultural environment with that shown by Japanese architects of the same generation Smith (1997) notes, "It seems odd that writers, the inheritors of a Soseki, an Abe, or an Oe, have so little to contribute as Japan finds its way forward" (p. 259). What seems lost is confidence and respect for that which one must assume to be what one is. But there is at the same time a sort of junior attempt to imitate Western "Zen punk" writers, like Tom Robbins from Seattle (*Another Roadside Attraction*, 1971, for instance). Yet Robbins's stories cannot work without presuming a truckload of traditional symbolism. The ability to admire past genius comes from contemporary confidence. What is found in some current Japanese arts (with the noteworthy exceptions of architecture, fashion, and animation) is what Harold Bloom (1973/1997) calls the anxiety of influence, and also an obsession with speed like Hollywood action movies, both thoroughly modern syndromes.

Even in the act of rejecting something, I must acknowledge its existence and even its power to motivate my act of rejection. The contextual position of the self relative to tradition and modernity forms not only the heteroglossia of contemporary Japan but of most of the world's developing peoples and, *by implication*, the so-called non-Japanese developed world, too. As Disney has demonstrated in the case of *The Lion King* (Allers & Minkoff, 1994), imitation is no longer unidirectional nor always the greatest form of flattery. Practically everywhere, identity is an issue.

### EVEN THE DESPISED PERSISTS

Despite the tidal wave of Western cultural influence, nothing is lost. Even in the act of a failed experiment things are created and learned. One of the most interesting twists in Japan's struggle to find itself is Okamoto's (1963) treatise "What Is Tradition?" This short work offers a way past the impossible choice of being imprisoned in a static tradition or endlessly imitating Western things. Like Soseki, Okamoto neither transcends nor renders irrele-

vant the oppositional forces between Japanese tradition and modernity, the community and the individual; instead he integrates them. We also find this in the symbiotic philosophy and architecture of Kisho Kurokawa, who attempted in his designs "to be at once public and private. To be open and closed at the same time. To be unified even while being fragmented: the antagonism of the multiple contradictions that architecture cannot escape" (1993, as quoted in Smith, 1997, p. 261).<sup>7</sup>

According to Okamoto (1963), "The most urgent task of contemporary art is to synthesize the global and the particularly local; to understand the particular from a global perspective; and to achieve a global perspective that is based in the particular" (as quoted in Munroe, 1994, p. 381). Okamoto reminds us of Jean Gebser's (1949/1985) notion of the integral consciousness that neither promotes homogenization to unity nor surrenders to the structure of system, but instead continually changes in a way Gebser calls *systasis*, which is neither system nor chaos but the interplay of the potential of each. According to Gebser, *systasis* is expressed by means of the *eteologeme* rather than the two-valued representational philosopheme. According to Kramer (1997):

Gebser argued that, just as philosophy had replaced myth, so "eteology" would replace dualistic, two-valued conceptualization. The *aperspectival* world does not establish orders as such. The validity of the group, the individual, and their relatedness is recognized but not as the one and only viable structure . . . what replaces the great logical systems that were articulated in the form of philosophemes and synchronic structures (ideological rationalisms) is a new form called the "eteologeme." (Kramer, 1997, p. 137)

*Eteologeme* is derived from the Greek *eteos*, which means "true, real." An *eteologeme* is a "verition" free of dualities, such as subject and object, permanence and flux, referent and representation. It "has nothing to do with representation; only in philosophical thought can the world be represented; according to integral perception, the world is pure statement, and thus 'verition'" (Gebser, 1949/1985, p. 309). System stresses statics, and *systasis* integrates time, thus manifesting a process of infinite morphogenesis (or, if one prefers, cultural churning, fusion, heteroglossia). *Systasis* means putting together or connecting phenomena (both spatial and nonspatial) so that partials merge. While system reveals static relationships (structure), *systasis* reveals a semantic world of synergies made both coherent but discontinuous within four-dimensional integrality (Fuller, 1975). Thus, *systasis* yields an (a)waring of temporalization and therefore a consciousness not of isolated (mutually excluding) self-contained systems, the monadology of Leibniz, but instead a communicative (temporal) field (for communication presumes time) that sustains community through time.

Some thirty years later Fuller would agree, coining the word *synergetics*. Fuller describes *synergetics*: "only one-half a century old, the science of Synergetics presents an experimentally verifiable, conceptual mathematics which faithfully accommodates all of the morphological dynamics of nature's inherently

four-dimensional behaviors" (Fuller, 1970, sections 101.01–102.00). He defines *synergy* also as the "behavior of integral, aggregate, whole systems unpredicted by behaviors of any of their components or subassemblies of their components taken separately from the whole" (Fuller, 1970, sections 101.01–102.00). Similarly, we find Bohm (1980) arguing that the traditional reductionistic notion of separate empirical objects, entities, and structures around us that seem relatively autonomous, stable, and temporary (what he calls subtotalities) are actually derived from a deeper, implicate order of unbroken yet continually changing wholeness, a "holomovement." The part-to-whole relationship of integrality is maintained as unique identities are not homogenized and lost but persist and communicate, creating a complex and dynamic system with internal stresses and harmonics. Just as Husserl (1913/1980) had stressed, the relationships are the important part of the universe. Bohm gives the analogy of a flowing stream:

On this stream, one may see an ever-changing pattern of vortices, ripples, waves, splashes, etc., which evidently have no independent existence as such. Rather, they are abstracted from the flowing movement, arising and vanishing in the total process of the flow. Such transitory subsistence as may be possessed by these abstracted forms implies only a relative independence or autonomy of behaviour, rather than absolutely independent existence as ultimate substances. (Bohm, 1980, p. 48)

According to Lewis Mumford (1934/1963), Gebser, Fuller, Bohm, Kisho Kurokawa (1994), and many others, community is not comprised of uniform assimilation whereby all converge on a single language or style of behavioral, cognitive, and affective identity, but rather an integral process of communication between diverse elements. This four-dimensional dynamic, rather than the one- and two-dimensional *x* and *y* graphical fixture (which was invented around 1350 by Nicolas Oresme in his *Tractatus de Latitudine Formarum*), is the origin of unfixed creativity that defies prediction, of life in all its delightful and awful randomness and surprise (Kramer, 2000a).

Without surprise there is no discovery and without discovery there is no science, only endless reproduction of the same, the handmaiden of enterprises that preposit goals and strategize action plans (developers) like militaries and businesses. For those who direct such institutions the future is limited by what they make of it. They do not like surprises but prefer fixed order, which enables normalization and efficiencies. This is a specific culture, the culture of empire and power politics. The fear of life with all its stresses and strains and anxieties fosters the dream of total certainty and equifinality, a fancy name for the *caput mortum* of life, otherwise known as death.

To both Gebser and Fuller, due to the realization of morphological dynamics in practically every field of scholarship, hypothetical thinking is reaching its limits. Many fields are achieving a status of art, in the ancient Greek sense, reaching beyond mere *techne* or engineering. Gebser and others are thus developing the hermeneutics of symbiotic histories and cultures exposing controlled aggregation to be something less than dynamic community (and

membership). Despite their differences in emphases, these scholars exhibit a pronounced agreement on the nature of reality as a much more surprising place than the old Newtonian mechanical view would permit.

## FLOWERS AND THE UNEXPECTED JAPAN

Unlike the view that tradition equals the antiquated, Okamoto argues that tradition is vital and alive in every present creation, even when that creation struggles to be different. For to be different presupposes that from which one is attempting to escape. According to Okamoto (1963) it is tradition itself, which "is the driving force that can tear down the old structure, open up the horizon for new ideas, and enable new possibilities" (as quoted in Munroe, 1994, p. 382). Okamoto has independently discovered what others have called the hermeneutic circle, which is neither closed nor vicious but limited and, as such, enables the possibility to go beyond itself. There can be no freedom without structure. Doors exist in walls. It is immature egocentrism to deny that we stand on the shoulders of giants, that the origin is ever present.

But it seems that both the excruciating interiority of the Meiji-era fictional characters and the shallow exteriority of the postmodern characters manifest the Western Cartesian dilemma. Neither seems at all indigenous to the Japanese world. This dilemma is an essentially Western construct with contingent Japanese content. What is essentially Japanese does appear, however, when the Western split between form and content, interior and exterior, is ignored. This happens, for example, in the uniquely Japanese sort of ambiguous space created by the *fusuma* sliding door (Kurokawa, 1988). A similar confidence of purpose is manifested in the work of the Sogetsu School of *ikebana* (flower arrangement), founded by Sofu Teshigahara and continued by his son Hiroshi.

## CONCLUSION

Hermeneutics is about the gap, the liminal in-betweenness of a world of endless diversities. The postmodernist world must presuppose these even while it deconstructs them, creating a homogenous place of identity crisis, a holism of nothingness and boredom, a pseudo-Zen, New Age of monotony. Even traces and grafts are rejected as obstacles to efficient functioning within the emergent world system.

This chapter began with one of the most famous quotes in Japanese literature, the first line of Kawabata's classic *Snow Country*. It is about a train journey taken by a modern man who has no caring attachments for the metropolis of Tokyo. It begins at Ueno station and ends in *ura nihon*. It is a passage from the modern to the traditional, the meaningless and the meaningful, to the land and woman who give him a purpose worth living and dying for. Written in the

1950s by a man who could still recall traditional Japan, by an author who straddled the boundary between the past and the present, the traverse manifests nostalgia, alienation, wonder, reflection, and finally great art.

Smith (1997) draws an important parallel between Kawabata's train trip and the one described in the 1982 novel *A Wild Sheep Chase* by Murakami. Smith notes that the postmodern trip crosses no great boundaries culturally, psychologically, or spiritually. Murakami's train ride is noteworthy for its "utter lack of sentiment" and boredom (p. 162).

During his journey the narrator scarcely bothers to look out the window. Instead he puzzles over an obscure history of the village he is heading toward. The book he found of desultory interest. "But if the truth be known, Junitaki today was a dreadfully dull town," he observes. "The townsfolk, when they came home from work, watched an average of four hours of television before going to bed each night." (Smith, 1997, p. 162; and Murakami, 1982, p. 208)

Murakami is describing the new improved Japan, the modern Japan, a Japan Inc. dominated by work without community, an aggregate of disconnected, unattached individuals, each peering at their televisions and increasingly personal/private computer screens in an unshared yet common attempt to forget the day's alienating labor and inevitable temporal pressure. The screen world is a mass phenomenon, a common form but without shared content. The mass society shares a grammar, a flowcharted ordination, but also a commercial content, one that is not consumed together. Increasingly people eat alone, read alone, watch alone, even have sex alone (Kramer, 1994).

One of the most common themes in world literature since World War II is this sense of loss—loss of community, self, interest, belonging, curiosity, hopefulness, attachment, caring, drama, *life*; many of the qualities now espoused by handmaidens and consultants as the singular "good, true, and beautiful" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 366). The new uniformity is robotic and insect-like, and this is the dream of the model minority ideology, with its push to include vaster numbers of us as we all become coordinated by the mechanical clock, the value of detached disinterest, abstract credit and corporate culture, with no sense of sentimental place or "spare time" but only "course work to get through" before we die (Nietzsche, 1886/1972, part one, section fourteen). Reflection dies when tragedy dies. This is the first age that has made numbing comfort of redundancy (certainty) its highest ideal, when philosophy is regarded as unproductive nonsense and value judgments pathetic subjectivism.

## NOTES

1. Although it is very fashionable these days to speak of the postcolonial situation, I see this as a misconception. To me the planet is currently undergoing more intense and

accelerating colonization than ever before. In other publications, I have referred to telecolonialism as one of the major ways colonization is occurring today (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). Basically I see nothing "post" about global homogenization and the loss of cultural and linguistic diversity that has accelerated greatly since World War II and is happening now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

2. Many years ago, while studying with Detlef Ingo Lauf, one of the world's greatest authorities on Eastern religions and Buddhism specifically, I asked him what he thought of the book *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values* (1984) by Robert Pirsig. Professor Lauf responded that beyond reiterating a bit of phenomenology of quality more or less well, it was typical "California consciousness" "beat-Zen." It is curious that the book would begin with "I can see by my watch." Lauf decried what had happened to his friend Allen Watts in California, where an "initially strong and serious young scholar" drifted into celebrity and alcoholism and where studying Buddhism too often meant listening to self-help cassettes while stuck on the highways.

3. Heteroglossia is evident in nonverbal communication. A wink, for instance, means different things among different people and in different contexts.

4. A point of clarification: I agree in principle with the dialogical imperative, but I do not accept the notion of holism nor that of reductionistic lingualism put forth by these earlier writers. Instead I argue, along with Gebser (1949/1985), that the world is an open horizon of potential interconnections that integrate (communicate) in various, often unpredictable ways, not a closed language system that has the potential of becoming totally homogeneous and thus nihilistic. Furthermore, I do not believe that meaning is generated only through words but also through artifactual deeds and even random acts that breach the consensual rules of language games. In this sense, I tend to agree with Roland Barthes (1982) when he argues for the universal semantization of experience, such that a sunset or a dog's smile have the same potential for meaning as a word. Therefore, the static logic of binary opposition is rendered inadequate as the sole explanation for morphology.

5. Also see David Korten's book *When Corporations Rule the World* (1995), the work of Teddy Goldsmith, the founding editor of *The Ecologist*, and Barnet and Cavanagh's *Global Dreams* (1995).

6. The first word of the first verse of the first canto of the first major work of the Western world, the *Iliad*, is *menin* (the accusative of *menis*) (Gebser, 1949/1949, pp. 70–78). The Greek word *menis* means "wrath" and "courage." *Menis* comes from the same stem as *menos*, meaning "resolve," "power," and "conviction." In turn, the Latin *mens* means "intent," "anger," "thinking," "thought," "understanding," and "deliberation" (not liberation). The masculine is manifested as directed or discursive thought, which is causal and willfully ordered. *Menos* is the root of *men(tal)*, as in the modern mental-rational mode of experiencing the world as opposed to the traditional mythological, emotional, and narrative way. The masculine seeks to control the cyclical nature of the imagination.

7. Also see Kurokawa's *Rediscovering Japanese Space* (1988), *From Metabolism to Symbiosis* (1992), and *The Philosophy of Symbiosis* (1994).

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## Chapter 2

## The Hidden Justification for Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and the Prospects for Democracy

John W. Murphy and Luigi Esposito

### INTRODUCTION

With the recent emphasis placed on multiculturalism, assimilation is again under attack. In fact, integration has become a code word in some circles for intolerance and discrimination. But assimilation has seldom been viewed without a healthy skepticism. The recent criticisms raised by multiculturalists about the repressive nature of assimilation are not new but represent the most recent attempt to illustrate that this kind of conformity is not necessary for order to prevail (Murphy & Choi, 1997, pp. 16–19).

During the 1920s, for example, pluralists such as Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne rejected the link that was made between assimilation and becoming an American.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the 1900s, and especially in the 1960s, Marxists and other conflict theorists argued that assimilation was based on racism and was used as a method to undermine a large segment of the working class. Even the pragmatists, including their sociological followers, recognized that maintaining order was a lot more complicated than just having persons assimilate to a cultural ideal. A host of writers, in short, has recognized that assimilation and the generation of a vibrant society are not synonymous.

Yet only recently, and to a very limited degree, has the hidden justification for assimilation been the focus of attention. Simply stated, the foundationalist character of traditional sociological theory has imposed strictures pertaining to how order has to be maintained (Fish, 1989, p. 542). In the field of race relations, assimilation was considered to be a logical extension of this theme. As a result of this trend, the political side of assimilation is overlooked; most persons tend to believe that assimilation is a rational social imperative. In terms reminiscent of Baudrillard (1983), assimilation is popular even among minorities because

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*I dedicate this book to two people I know and admire for their courage to change society rather than passively "adapt" to it just for personal security and comfort, and who have generously spent many hours teaching me about the true and revolutionary essence of the ongoing American experiment: Professors George Henderson and Melvin Tolson. This is also dedicated to Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher, who sued for her right to attend the University of Oklahoma law school in 1946, a case that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. It is also important to remember the white students, professors, and administrators who supported these people in the face of majority indignation. These three, who were willing to "die to make a difference," as Professor Henderson has conveyed to me, made it possible for women and people of color to attend and teach at the University of Oklahoma.*

*During hours of conversation with Henderson, he relayed to me many truths, some very personal. With his permission I share a few: In 1967, the Henderson family became the first black family to own a house in Norman, Oklahoma. One of their neighbors at the time asked his minister why God hated him so much that He allowed a black family to move in next door. The family's windows were broken, racial slurs were endured, and Professor Henderson suffered doubt from what he had asked his family to endure by moving to Norman. Today, he is one of the most celebrated faculty members at the University of Oklahoma, having a wall full of awards, including being named a Regent's Professor. His conviction of presence changed the state and the university.*

*Ms. Fisher later became a member of the board of regents to the university that once denied her admission.*